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IMPLYING PRIVATE RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACTS
WILLIAM

F. SCHNEIDERt

Between 1964 and 1975, the Supreme Court tended tofavor recognizing implied causes of action based on thefederalsecurities laws. In
so doing, the Courtfocused on whether implication wouldfurther the
goals Congress sought to accomplish by enacting the statutory provisions. Since 1975 the Court has been much less willing to imply new
causes of action, and hasfocused instead on whether Congress manifested an intention to allow aprivatepartyto sue. ProfessorSchneider
begins by noting that the Court often has confused the issues ofimplying
a cause of action and implying a remedy, andnotes that courts historically have hadmuch morefreedom to imply a remedy. After a detailed
analysis of the evolution of Supreme Courtjurisprudencein this area,
ProfessorSchneider concludes that the Court needs to recognize more
clearly the nature of its inquiry and needs to read congressionalintent
more broadly than it has in recent cases.

In 1916 the United States Supreme Court first recognized a private party's
right to obtain a remedy in federal court for injuries caused by a violation of a
federal statute not expressly providing for a private cause of action.' In Texas

& Pacific Railway v. Rigsby,2 decided that year, the Court held that disregarding the command of a statute "is a wrongful act, and where it results in dam-

age to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the
right to recover the damages from the party in default is implied. . . .'? Al-

though prior to 1975 causes of action were not implied from every statute asserted as a basis for implication, 4 until that date the Supreme Court did not
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. B.A. 1972, J.D. 1976,
Florida.
1. This definition of an implied cause of action is a paraphrase of the definition formulated
by Justice Powell in his dissent to Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). Justice
Powell stated:
[Tihe phrase "private cause of action" may not have a completely clear meaning. As the

term is used herein, I refer to the right of a private party to seek judicial relief from
injuries caused by another's violation of a legal requirement. In the context of legislation
enacted by Congress, the legal requirement involved is a statutory duty.
Id. at 730 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
2. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
3. Id. at 39. Rigsby is cited as having recognized implication of a private cause of action for
damages under the Federal Safety Appliance Act. Not all commentators or current members of
the United States Supreme Court agree that a private cause of action was implied in Rigsby. It
has been argued that the Rigsby Court, exercising its pre-Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
common-law powers, merely applied a statutory standard in a common-law negligence case. See,
e.g., Gamin & Eisberg, The Implied Rights Doctrine, 41 UMKC L. REv. 292, 293 n.4 (1972);
Comment, Implying Private Causes of
action From FederalStatutes: Amtrak and Cort Apply the
Brakes, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv.53, 54 (1975). See also Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677, 732 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
4. See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
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question the holding of Rigsby or indicate that judicial implication was not an
appropriate function of the federal courts. In a series of opinions rendered
since 1975, however, the Court has, with few exceptions, refused to recognize
5
the implication of new causes of action.

The negative outcomes of the recent implication cases represent an im-

plicit and sometimes acknowledged shift in the Court's policy.6 The Court has
made clear that for policy reasons it should not exercise such power often, if at

all. In its recent decisions, the Court has also raised serious questions about its
power even to recognize implied causes of action. It has stated unequivocally

that the intent of Congress should determine whether a cause of action can be
implied from a statute not expressly providing for one.7 Absent congressional

intent to authorize a private cause of action, such an action cannot be judicially recognized, even if the Court finds that recognition would further important policies. 8 Unfortunately, the Court has not adequately explained what it
453 (1974) (4mtrak) (no private right of action to enforce compliance with the Rail Passenger
Service Act of 1970 (Amtrak Act)); Calhoun v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964) (no private right of
action to enforce Title IV of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959);
Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963) (no private right of action for damages implied from a
United States House of Representatives rule authorizing the issuance of subpoenas upon the signature of any committee chairman or any member of a committee designated by the chairman);
T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959) (no private right of action implied from the
Motor Carrier Act of 1935).
5. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. I
(1981) (Federal Water Pollution Control Act and Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries
Act of 1972 do not provide implied causes of action); Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S.
630 (1981) (implied cause of action for contribution not available to defendant in federal antitrust
case); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981) (Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act does
not provide an implied right of action); Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S.
77 (1981) (Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 do not provide an
implied right of action for contribution); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754
(1981) (Davis-Bacon Act does not provide employee with a private cause of action for back wages
under a contract that has been administratively determined not to call for work subject to the Act
and thus does not contain prevailing wage stipulations); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (§ 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 provides no implied cause
of action); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (no implied cause of action for
damages under § 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S.
281 (1979) (Freedom of Information Act and Trade Secrets Act do not provide private causes of
action to enjoin disclosure); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (Indian Civil
Rights Act does not impliedly authorize private action for declaratory or injunctive relief). But see
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982) (recognizing an implied cause of action under the Commodities Exchange Act); Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677 (1979) (private cause of action exists under Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972).
6. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
Justice Stevens stated, "The increased volume of federal litigation strongly supported the desirability of a more careful scrutiny of legislative intent than Rigsby had required. Our cases subsequent to Cort v. Ash have plainly stated that our focus must be on 'the intent of Congress.!" Id. at
377.
7. This limited view of the judicial role clearly reflects a shift in the Court's view. The
Rigsby Court, for example, did not purport to determine whether Congress intended to create or
authorize a private cause of action. Instead, the Court was concerned with whether the legislation
under review was intended to impose any duties on the defendant and whether the duties imposed
were intended to protect the plaintiff. After resolving both issues affirmatively, the Court allowed
the plaintiff to sue. Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 39-40.
8. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) ("The ultimate
question is one of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks that it can improve

1984]

IMPLIED CA USES OF ACTION

means by congressional intent to create a private cause of action.
When a court says a cause of action (or right of action) exists, it usually
means that a plaintiff may bring suit in that court to obtain a particular remedy for another party's violation of a duty. In determining whether a cause of
action exists, therefore, a coart necessarily decides questions about its jurisdiction, the rights and duties created by the statute, the availability of remedies,
and the standing of the parties. 9 Undei'-6ur constitutional system, the federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and have no power to legislate; a federal court must have constitutional and usually legislative authority to exercise
jurisdiction and Congress must be the source of statutorily created rights and
duties. Once constitutionally or statutorily created rights are violated, however, federal courts traditionally have been viewed as having the power to
fashion remedies and to decide questions of standing.' 0 Thus, it is crucial
whether implication involves creating jurisdiction or rights and duties, or
merely provides a remedy for persons injured when rights created by the Constitution or Congress are violated. Because a federal court has no power to
create jurisdiction or rights and duties, it would seem necessary to show congressional intent to create both. Since the federal courts arguably have the
power to fashion remedies once jurisdiction and rights are discerned, it may
not be necessary to show congressional intent to allow the court to provide a
remedy.
A review of the Supreme Court's implication cases reveals a repeated failure to distinguish between implying (creating) rights and duties and implying
remedies, and consequently a failure to indicate whether congressional intent
to do either or both must be shown before a court can recognize implication.
For this reason, the analytical tool the Court has adopted for resolving implication cases-discerning legislative intent-does not satisfactorily reconcile its
prior holdings, does not serve as a useful predictor of when, if ever, implication will be allowed, and raises without resolving constitutional questions regarding the power of the federal courts. The existing decisions can be better
harmonized, however, and important policy considerations can be effectuated
without unnecessarily restricting the power of the federal courts, if the implication cases are analyzed in terms of whether congressional intent to confer
upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law."); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors,
Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979):
While some opinions of the Court have placed considerable emphasis upon the desirability of implying private rights of action in order to provide remedies thought to effectuate
the purpose of a given statute. . ., what must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted, as our recent decisions have made
clear.
9. Courts frequently use the terms "cause of action," "right of action," and "private remedy" interchangeably. In this Article, the term "cause of action" will be used when referring
generally to an inquiry or the result of an inquiry that involved all four questions listed in the text.
The term "right of action" will be used when referring to the question whether the plaintiff is
entitled to file suit to obtain a remedy of some sort. The term "remedy" will be used when referring to the answer to the question whether a particular form of relief (ie., damages, rescission, or
injunction) will be made available to a litigant. See infra note 19.
10. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 736 n.6 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting); L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1064 (1983.). See also infra note 27.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

jurisdiction, create a right of action, provide a remedy, or to confer standing
can be shown.
Because many of the important implication cases have arisen under the

federal securities acts, the focus of this Article is on implication from the securities laws." Part I sets forth a structure for analyzing the Supreme Court

cases, primarily by articulating the differences between what the Court does
when it finds there is jurisdiction and what it does when it either implies a
cause of action or implies a remedy. Part I also provides an overview of the
federal securities laws and briefly explains why they have been a source for

judicial implication. Part II analyzes Supreme Court cases and traces the
shifts in the Court's approach to implication questions over the last twenty
years. Part III contains a critical analysis of the current status of implication
jurisprudence and concludes that the Court's inconsistent approach has made
it difficult to use the decisional law as a basis for predicting the outcome of
future controversies. Hidden in the cases, however, is a workable test, which if
consistently applied creates a coherent analytical framework that courts can
use to resolve correctly differing implication cases. This standard is explained
and applied to the Court's prior cases to demonstrate the utility of a proper
analytical approach. The Article will not examine cases implying a cause of
action from a constitutional provision.12
I.

AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

A. Jurisdiction
The federal trial courts, unlike state courts of general jurisdiction, must be

constitutionally authorized to entertain the cases that come before them. Even
when constitutional power is present, in most instances 13 jurisdiction must also
be found in general or special statutes enacted by Congress.14 This power to
1I. Securities laws implication cases were decided both before and after the United States
Supreme Court adopted its current emphasis on legislative intent. The Court has recognized and
refused to recognize causes of action implied from provisions of the securities laws. In addition,
the securities laws contain provisions that have been deemed by the Court to be both representative and anomalous of other statutes that have been the basis for implication.
12. Implication of a cause of action from a constitutional provision, as opposed to a statute
enacted by Congress, involves different considerations. The federal courts are precluded from
legislating by article III, § I of the Constitution. They cannot create substantive rights and duties.
In our federal system it is Congress that has the power to create such rights and duties, unless the
right sought to be enforced is one protected by the Constitution. The Supreme Court, in its role as
the guardian of constitutionally guaranteed rights, arguably does not need congressional action in
order for it to allow judicial enforcement of such rights. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241
(1979) ("The question of who may enforce a statutory right is fundamentally different from the
question of who may enforce a right that is protected by the Constitution."). See also Annot., 64
L. Ed. 2d 872 (1981).
13. The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, maritime and admiralty jurisdiction, and the
so called federal common-law jurisdiction (derived from Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448 (1957)), are the principal exceptions. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H.
WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

1973).
14. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-31, at 115 (1978).

786 (2d ed.
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hear cases may be viewed conceptually as divisible into four types of
authority.
First, the subject of the claim before the court generally must be one that
Congress has indicated should be adjudicated in a federal forum. A general
jurisdictional statute is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a federal court. For
example, 28 U.S.C. section 1331 confers on the federal courts jurisdiction to
hear questions arising "under the Constitution or laws of the United States." 15
Jurisdiction may also be conferred on a federal court by a more specific grant,
such as section 27 of the Securities Exhange Act of 1934, which provides that
the federal district courts, concurrently with the state courts, shall have jurisdiction of "all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liabilmatter
ity or duty created by [the Exchange Act]."' 16 Without such subject
17
jurisdiction the court would be compelled to dismiss the action.
Second, the federal court, even though it has subject matter jurisdiction,
must find that the claim is one that Congress has either specifically or impliedly authorized the courts to recognize and, assuming adequate proof of
injury, to redress.' 8 Third, the court must have the authority to award the
specific type of relief requested (e.g., damages or an injunction).1 9 If either of
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982).
17. See FED.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
18. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 (1979); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678,
682 (1946). Distinguishing between this type of power and that labelled "subject matter jurisdiction" above has been a source of confusion in several of the implication cases. See, e.g., infra text
accompanying notes 53-57.

19. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), a case in which the Supreme Court recognized
an implied cause of action based upon a violation of a constitutional provision, Justice Brennan
distinguished the question of what relief, if any, a litigant may be entitled to receive from the
"analytically distinct and prior" question whether a litigant has a cause of action. He defined the
term, or concept of, a "cause of action" as one "employed specifically to determine who may
judicially enforce the statutory rights or obligations." Id. at 239. In a footnote, Justice Brennan
went on to state the following:
[J]urisdiction is a question of whether a federal court has the power, under the Constitution or laws of the United States, to hear a case; standing is a question of whether a
plaintiff is sufficiently adversary to a defendant to create an Art. III case or controversy,
or at least to overcome prudential limitations on federal-court jurisdiction; cause of action is a question of whether a particular plaintiff is a member of the class of litigants
that may, as a matter of law, appropriately invoke the power of the court; and relief is a
question of the various remedies a federal court may make available. A plaintiff may
have a cause of action even though he be entitled to no relief at all ..... Whether
petitioner has asserted a cause of action, however, depends not on the quality or extent of
her injury, but on whether the class of litigants of which petitioner is a member may use
the courts to enforce the right at issue. The focus must therefore be on the nature of the
right petitioner asserts.
Id. at 239 n.18 (citations omitted).
Arguably, Justice Brennan's definition of the term "cause of action" poses a question that is
often considered to be part of the standing question. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1616 n.3 (10th ed. 1980), in which Professor Gunther notes that while the most common
article III problem has been the extent to which Congress can grant court access to plaintiffs not
showing traditional injuries, recent Supreme Court decisions have brought to the fore a quite
different aspect of Court-Congress relations. This aspect focuses on the delineation of remedies:
the situation that exists when Congress fails to grant explicit remedies for violation of constitutional rights or fails to establish clear private remedies for the enforcement of new statutory rights.
Id. There is a danger in confusing or combining the standing question with what constitutes a
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these latter two categories of power are lacking, the court, even though it has
subject matter jurisdiction, will dismiss the action for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. 20 Finally, a plaintiff must have standinghe must be sufficiently adverse to a defendant to create an article III case or
controversy2 l--before a federal court will exercise its jurisdictional power.
The lower court cases discussing these issues have at times confusingly
referred to the absence of any one of the four types of authority simply as a
lack of jurisdiction. 22 For example, if a court did not find an implied right of
action or an implied remedy, it dismissed the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction instead of for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. Such a disposition raises questions about the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts to entertain cases involving claims based on implied
rights. While the Supreme Court consistently has held that the federal courts
have subject matter jurisdiction to hear cases based on implied rights, 23 it has
not articulated clearly how the questions whether a right of action existed and
whether a particular remedy could be granted are affected
by the recognition
24
that a federal court had subject matter jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court frequently does not make clear in deciding implied
cause of action cases whether its holding is based on a finding that a private
right of action cannot be implied from the statute in question or whether its
holding is simply that the relief sought by the plaintiff is not within the power
of the Court to grant. The Court frequently uses the term "implied right of
action" (or "cause of action") interchangeably with the term "implied remedy." 25 Furthermore, in at least one case, the Court resolved a securities statute implication case in terms of26standing when arguably the question was
whether a right of action existed.
The confusion between right of action and remedy presents the most serious problems. The federal courts have long exercised flexibility and discretion
when fashioning remedies. 27 The federal courts' ability to imply rights of accause of action, because a cause of action can exist although the particular plaintiff asserting the
right may be deemed not to have standing.

See supra note 9 for an explanation of how the term "cause of action" is used in this Article.
20. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
21. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
22. See, e.g., Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 679-80 (1946).
23. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Bell v,
Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). None of the securities laws implication cases has been decided by the
Supreme Court on the ground that the federal courts lack jurisdiction.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 53-59.
25. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). "There are other questions, but the principal
issue presented for decision is whether a private cause of action for damages against corporate
directors can be implied.
... id at 68; "and sought a private claim for relief. . . ... id at 71;
"In determining whether a private remedy is implicit.
id at 78; "is the cause of action one
26. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), discussed .nfra text accompanying
notes 125-148.
27. In J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), the Court cited the following cases to support
this proposition: Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948) (federal court
has power to devise equitable remedy for expressly created equitable right of action); Porter v.
Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946) (federal court has power to devise equitable remedy for
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tion, however, is neither historically based nor widely accepted.2 8 Consequently, the need to show legislative authorization or intent is much greater

when a federal court wishes to hold that a right of action exists than when it
wishes to grant a particular remedy.
B.

Securities Legislation Background
Federal securities legislation2 9 regulates most domestic securities transac-

tions.3 0 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the principal fed-

eral agency responsible for enforcing and administering the federal securities
laws. 3' Although the SEC has various statutory powers enabling it to enforce
the securities laws and its own regulations, it has no power to require a securi-

ties law violator to compensate persons who suffer damages from prohibited
conduct. 32 A person injured as a result of a securities law violation must sue
expressly created equitable right of action); Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282
(1940) (federal court has power to devise equitable remedies to supplement expressly created damage remedy for expressly created private right of action). In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982), Justice Stevens cited to Justice Frankfurter's dissenting
opinion in Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951), for
the same proposition. In his dissent in Montana-Dakota, Justice Frankfurter cites Board of
Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939), Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S.
515 (1937), Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930), as cases
in which the Court exercised its "well-defined powers" to fashion familiar remedies to enforce
statutory obligations even though there was no explicit statutory authorization to do so. MontanaDakota, 341 U.S. at 261 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
There has not been an attempt to refute the power of the federal courts to fashion or imply
remedies similar to that made against implying rights of action, even in Justice Powell's strong
dissents in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), and Curran, 456 U.S. 353,
decisions in which a majority of the Court was willing to imply a cause of action.
28. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730 (1979) (Powell, J. dissenting); L. Loss, supra note 10, at 1056-58; 2 L. Loss, SECURuTIEs REGULATION 934-36 (2d ed. 1961)
[hereinafter cited as - L. Loss].
29. In chronological order of enactment by Congress, the federal laws affecting securities are:
Securities Act of 1933, §§ 1-26, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§§ 1-35, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 §§ 1-33, 15
U.S.C. §§ 79a to 79z-6 (1982); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, §§ 301-328, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa77bbbb; Investment Company Act of 1940, §§ 1-65, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64; Investment Advisors Act of 1940, §§ 201-222, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I to -21 (1982); Securities Investor Protection Act
of 1970, §§ 1-16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78//l (1982).
30. Certain transactions, securities, and persons engaging in securities transactions are exempted from one or more of the acts or parts thereof. For example, the Securities Act of 1933
exempts the issuance of securities by local, state, and federal governments from the registration
provisions of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1982), and the Investment Company Act of 1940
exempts from the definition of investment company any bank or insurance company, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-3(c)(3) (1982).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1982). Certain matters are specifically designated to be administered by
other federal agencies. For example, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is
authorized to prescribe rules and regulations regulating the amount of credit that can be extended
and maintained on any security. Id. § 78g(a).
32. For example, the SEC may refuse to declare the registration of securities effective, 15
U.S.C. § 77h(b); may conduct hearings to determine if violations of the law have occurred, 15
U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4); and where appropriate may deny, suspend, or revoke the registrations of broker-dealers, id.; and may censure individuals for misconduct or bar them from employment with a
registered broker-dealer, id. § 78o(b)(6). The SEC may refer facts indicating the commission of a
fraud or other willful violation to the Department of Justice with a recommendation for criminal
prosecution of the offending persons. The Justice Department, through its local United States
attorneys, may present evidence to a federal grand jury and seek an indictment for a willful violation of a securities statute, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b). The SEC may apply to an appropriate United
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in state or federal court to recover damages or obtain other forms of personal
33

relief.

Three different types of provisions in the federal securities laws provide or
may provide the basis for private suit: provisions explicitly creating private
causes of action for rescission or money damages; 34 provisions purporting to
affect the legal relationships between private parties but not expressly creating
private causes of action; 35 and provisions requiring or prohibiting certain conStates district court for an order enjoining those acts or practices alleged to violate the law or
commission rules, id. In connection with some injunction actions, the SEC has requested, and the
court has granted, "ancillary relief," an order directing the violator to pay over his profits to a
depository for distribution to persons entitled to recovery. See, e.g., SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325
(5th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. E & H Oil Co., [1980
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,652 (W.D. La. 1980); SEC v. Golconda Mining Co.,
327 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y
1970), aft'd, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). See also SEC v.
Wills, 472 F. Supp. 1250 (D.D.C. 1978) (ancillary relief appropriate remedy in some circumstances, but not applicable to the facts). Such relief is considered ancillary to the court's equity
jurisdiction and is based on a theory of deterrence rather than compensation. L. Loss, supra note
10, at 1176-78.
33. Five of the seven federal securities acts provide for concurrent federal and state jurisdiction over private civil actions, while granting exclusive federal jurisdiction over criminal proceedings and enforcement actions by the SEC. Securities Act of 1933 § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a)
(1982); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, § 25, 15 U.S.C. § 79y (1982); Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 322(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77vvv (1982); Investment Company Act of 1940, § 44, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-44 (1982); Investment Advisors Act of 1940, §214, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1982). Section
27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 grants exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts over
all suits. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982). The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, § 5, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78eee(b) (1982), provides that the securities investor corporation may apply to any court of competent jurisdiction specified in 15 U.S.C. § 78aa or § 78u(e) (1982) to seek enforcement of the Act's
provisions. Section 78aa is the jurisdictional provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
§ 78u(e) is a provision granting the SEC the power to seek injunctions under the Exchange Act.
34. The Securities Act of 1933 contains three provisions that expressly provide for private
causes of action. Section 11 provides a private cause of action for the purchaser of a registered
security when a false or misleading statement is included in the registration statement, 15 U..S.C.
§ 77k(a) (1982); § 12(1) makes a person who offers or sells a security in violation of the registration
and prospectus delivery requirements liable to the purchaser, id. § 771(1); and § 12(2) provides
civil liability for false or misleading statements in connection with the sale (although not the
purchase) of a security, id. § 771(2).
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 also contains three sections expressly providing for civil
liability. Section 9(e) provides that any person who "wilfully participates" in any act or transaction in violation of § 9's provisions regarding price manipulation of securities listed on national
securities exchanges, "shall be liable to any person who shall purchase or sell any security at a
price which was affected by such act or transaction," 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1982); § 18 imposes civil
liability on any person who makes or causes to be made a false or misleading statement contained
in any application, report, or other document filed with the SEC pursuant to the Exchange Act or
any rule or regulation thereunder, id. § 78r(a); and § 16(b) provides for recovery by the issuer of
any profit made by an insider on a sale of the issuer's securities within a period of less than six
months, id. § 78p(b).
The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 contains two provisions expressly providing for private causes of action. Section 16(a) incorporates § 18 of the Exchange Act by reference,
15 U.S.C § 79p(a) (1982). Section 17(b), id. § 79p(b), is similar to § 16(b) of the Exchange Act.
The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 includes one civil liability provision, § 323(a), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77aaw(a) (1982), which is modeled on § 18 of the Exchange Act. The Investment Company Act
of 1940 includes one civil liability provision, § 30(0, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-30(f) (1982), which is comparable to § 16(b) of the Exchange Act. There are no provisions in the Investment Advisers Act of
1940 or the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 expressly providing for a private cause of
action.
35. See, e.g., § 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1982).
Section 29(b) provides generally that every contract formed or performed in violation of the Ex-

1984]

IMPLIED CAUSES OF ACTION

duct or declaring acts to be unlawful without expressly authorizing private
36
causes of action.
Section 12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, an example of the first type of

provision, makes a person who offers or sells a security in violation of the
registration and prospectus delivery requirements of the Act liable to the purchaser of the security.37 Section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
illustrates the second type; it provides generally that every contract formed or
performed in violation of the Exchange Act or any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder "shall be void" with respect to the rights of the violating
party or his successor who takes with knowledge.3 8 Section 29(b) does not

specify how the provision is to be enforced, however. Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act is an example of the third type of provision; it makes unlawful

manipulation or deception in contravention
of SEC rules in connection with
39
the purchase or sale of any security.

The provisions expressly providing private causes of action have not been
the most useful to persons seeking remedies for conduct violating the federal

securities laws. The statutes creating such causes of action contain restrictions
and defenses that make them less useful to plaintiffs.40 Furthermore, not all

conduct that violates the acts is made the basis of liability, and the express
provisions generally provide only for the recovery of money damages or for

rescission. Therefore, courts find a need to imply causes of action based on
provisions of the second and third types.
The earliest lower court decisions implying private causes of action from
change Act or any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder "shall be void" as regards the rights
of the violating party or his successor who takes with knowledge. Similar but not identical provisions are § 26(b) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79z(b) (1982),
§ 47(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-47(b) (1982), and § 215(b) of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C § 15(b) (1982). The Securities Act of 1933, Trust Indenture Act of 1939, and Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 do not contain voidability
provisions.
36. The United States Supreme Court has recognized implied private causes of action to
enforce § 10(b) and § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and
§ 78n(a) (1982). See Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971)
(§ 10(b)); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (§ 14(a)). Both of these sections declare
certain conduct to be unlawful. Many state and lower federal court decisions have recognized
implied private causes of action based on other provisions of the federal securities laws or the
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. See e.g., cases cited in ALI FED. SEC. CODE
§ 1722 (1980).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b).
39. Id. § 78j(b).
40. For example, § 13 of the Securities Act of 1933 establishes a federal statute of limitations
for all civil actions under § 11 and § 12. 15 U.S.C. § 77(m) (1982). In general, the limitations
period is one year after the discovery of the violation but no more than three years after the sale of
the security to the public. Sections 9(e) and 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 also contain
similar, relatively short, one-year and three-year statutes of limitations. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e), (r)
(1982). In addition, § 9(e) and § 18 give the courts discretion to require an undertaking for costs,
including attorney's fees, against either party litigant. Section 9(e) is limited to transactions involving securities listed on the national securities exchanges. Section 18 provides for liability only
to a person who "purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected by such statement"
and only if this plaintiff acted "in reliance upon such statement" and the defendant is not liable if
he "acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or misleading." Id.
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provisions of the federal securities laws reasoned that a party injured by a
violation of a statute that did not provide a private cause of action, but that
had been enacted in whole or in part to protect an interest of the injured party,
is entitled to recover damages caused by a violation of the statutorily imposed
duty.4 1 This approach is generally 42
referred to as the tort theory, since it had
its origins in the law of negligence.
An alternative ground for implying private causes of action from the securities laws was based on the existence of voidability provisions in several of
the acts. 4 3 Some of the early cases assumed not only that a private cause of
action for rescission could be implied from the voidability provisions but also
that damages could be recovered in such an action. 44 The voidability sections
were cited by the courts as both an independent basis for implied civil liability
45
and as a supporting basis for the tort theory.
Although the vast majority of lower courts considering the issue prior to
the late 1970s implied causes of action from various provisions of the federal
securities laws, some courts did not. The reasons given for not doing so varied, but generally fell into one of three categories: the court before which the
action was pending had no jurisdiction to hear the claim, 4 6 the court was without power to grant the particular remedy sought, 47 or the plaintiff was not
within the category of individuals intended to be protected by the provision. 48
41. See, e.g., Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944)
(implying private cause of action from § 6(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1982)). See
also Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944) (implying
cause of action to enforce § 4(a)(2) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 15 U.S.C.
§79d(a)(2) (1982)); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (implying a
private cause of action under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1982)).
t42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A (1977). See also W. PROSSER, LAW OF
ToRTs § 36 (4th ed. 1971).
43. See supra note 35.

44. See, e.g., Warshow v. Hentz & Co., 199 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Geismar v. Bond
& Goodwin, 40 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). See also cases cited in 3 L. Loss, supra note 28, at
1760 n.253; 6 L. Loss, supra note 28, at 3867 (2d ed. Supp. 1969); Gruenbaum & Steinberg, Section
29(b) ofthe SecuritiesExchangeAct of1934: A Viable RemedyAwakened, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1, 25 nn.117-19 (1979).
45. See, e.g., Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Geismar v. Bond &
Goodwin, 40 F. Supp. 876, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). Section 26(b) of the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79z(b) (1982), provided a basis for implied liability in addition
to the common-law tort doctrine in Goldwin v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422, 426-27 (2d Cir.), cer.
denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944). See also Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 512-14
(E.D. Pa. 1946) (tort theory as well as § 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78cc(b) (1982) provide bases for imposing liability in private civil action for violating § 10(b) of
the Exchange Act, id. § 78j(b)).
46. See, e.g., Downing v. Howard, 162 F.2d 654, 659 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 818
(1947) (action dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction although the basis of the decision
seemed to be a failure to prove a legal connection between the violation of the statute and the
loss).
47. See, e.g., Goldsmith v. Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 5 SEC JUD. DEC. 795, 799-800 (N.D.
Ohio 1948) (oral opinion, written findings and conclusions) (no private right to sue for an injunction against further violations of rule lOb-5, since the statute vests this remedy exclusively in the
SEC).
48. See, e.g., Howard v. Furst, 238 F.2d 790, 793 (2d Cir. 1956) (proxy"-provisions of the
Exchange Act are designed to protect shareholders and will not sustain an implied action brought
derivatively on behalf of a corporation).
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The cases denying implication were always a distinct minority, however, and

after the Supreme Court ruled favorably in a securities law implication case in
1964, they were believed to be generally discredited.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT CASES

A.

Borak to Barbour-A Remedy for Every Right
I Although the lower courts began implying actions under the securities
acts in the mid-1940s, the Supreme Court did not uphold implication in a
securities case until 1964. In J.! Case Co. v. Borak,49 an opinion as notable

for its unclear reasoning as for its groundbreaking holding, 50 the Court unanimously held that a corporate shareholder could sue for damages resulting

from the circulation of a false and misleading proxy statement in violation of
section 14(a) of the Exchange Act. Section 14(a) contains no language ex-

pressly authorizing a private cause of action. The section does, however, declare certain conduct unlawful. 5 ' By recognizing the shareholder's right to

bring the action, the Supreme Court for the first time explicitly recognized that
it was proper to imply a private cause of action from a provision of a federal

securities act, at least when the provision made particular conduct illegal.
The Court stated the issue as whether section 27 of the Exchange Act

"authorizes a federal cause of action for rescission or damages to a corporate

stockholder with respect to a consummated merger which was authorized pur-

suant to the use of a proxy statement alleged to contain false and misleading

statements violative of Section 14(a) of the Act."' 52 Section 27 of the Exchange

Act gives federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over any suit or action brought
to enforce any liability or duty created by the Act.53 The section plainly was
intended to be a general jurisdictional grant providing criminal as well as civil
subject matter jurisdiction and is not relevant to deciding whether a private
cause of action can be implied from section 14(a). 54 By framing the issue in
49. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
50. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 735-36 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 402-03 n.4
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also L. Loss, supra note 10, at 1063-64.
51. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982). Section 14(a)
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or
otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors,
to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization
in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 12 of this title.
Id.
52. Borak, 377 U.S. at 428.
53. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982).
54. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 (1979):
Section 27 grants jurisdiction to the federal courts and provides for venue and service of
process. It creates no cause of action of its own force and effect; it imposes no liabilities.
The source of plaintiffs' rights must be found, if at all, in the substantive provisions of
the 1934 Act which they seek to enforce, not in the jurisdictional provision.
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the manner in which it did, the Court confused the question of subject matter
jurisdiction with the question of whether a right of action can be implied, two

analytically distinct issues. 55 Furthermore, it raised the possibility that by recognizing subject matter jurisdiction based on a general jurisdictional statute,

the Court was also holding that a substantive private right of action was contained in, or could be implied from, the jurisdictional statute, thus creating a
fourth type of statute that could be the source of an implied cause of action. If
the Court in fact meant for section 27 to be interpreted in such a manner,
Borak was a radical decision, for such an interpretation in effect would give
the Court the power to legislate-to be the source of substantive rights and
duties. 56 It was not until 1979 that the Supreme Court made clear that it did

not intend such a result in Borak, or, if it had so intended, it overruled that
57
part of the decision which gave the Court this broad power.

The Borak Court's analysis relating to the jurisdiction versus cause of
action issue did not decrease the confusion. The Court stated:

It appears clear that private parties have a right under Section 27 to
bring suit for violation of Section 14(a) of the Act. Indeed, this section specifically grants the appropriate district courts jurisdiction
over all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any
liability or duty created under the Act. 58
Again, the Court's language caused, or perhaps just permitted, confusion between recognizing the existence of subject matter jurisdiction and implying
9
5
private rights of action.

55. The question of the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction to hear a claim based on an
alleged violation of § 14(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982), was not raised, addressed, or answered in the opinion of the court of appeals below. The court of appeals, relying
on precedent in another circuit, assumed that a cause of action implied from § 14(a) stated a claim
upon which some relief could be granted. Borak v. J.I. Case Co., 317 F.2d 838, 848-49 (7th Cir.
1963), af'd, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). The question actually addressed in the lower court opinion
concerned the power of the federal court to provide the particular remedy sought by the plaintiff-rescission and damages as opposed to a declaratory judgment.
56. There is an alternative, however, to reading substantive content into § 27. It is arguable
that all the Court wanted to do when it stated that "private parties have a right under section 27 to
bring suit for violation of section 14(a) ... " Borak, 377 U.S. at 430-31, was to establish firmly
that the federal courts had subject matter jurisdiction to hear suits alleging violations of the Exchange Act, as opposed to holding that § 27 was in part the source of the judicial power to imply a
cause of action. The Court may have wanted to establish subject matter jurisdiction because of
the confusion in the lower courts between dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
dismissals for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. If that is all the Court
wanted to do, however, it is unclear why no authority in support of the summary statement was
cited. There were cases establishing that point, such as Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
57. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). In Touche Ross Justice Rehnquist
stated:
The Court in Borak found a private cause of action implicit in Sec. 14(a). . . . We do
not now question the actual holding of that case, but we decline to read the opinion so
broadly that virtually every provision of the securities Acts gives rise to an implied private cause of action.
Id at 577 (citations omitted).
58. Borak, 377 U.S. at 430-31.
59. In the concluding paragraphs of the opinion, the Court introduced an additional factor
that further confuses understanding what the Court believed the impact to be of § 27 on the
sources of the federal courts' power to imply causes of action and remedies. In holding that
§ 14(a) would control the remedy question despite the existence of relevant state corporation law,
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Even assuming, however, that the Court merely wanted to establish the
presence of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court went on to determine that it
had the power to imply a right of action and to fashion an appropriate remedy.
Furthermore, the Court recognized that the two issues were severable, pointing out that the petitioner was questioning not only the power of the Court to
grant the relief sought by plaintiff but also the power of the Court to recognize
the right of a private party to bring an action based on a violation.
To answer the question whether a private right of action could be implied
from section 14(a), Justice Clark examined the legislative intent behind section
14(a), and determined that a purpose of section 14(a) "is to prevent management or others from obtaining authorization for corporate action by means of
deceptive or inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation."'60 He then emphasized the language in the statute that anticipates the prescription by the SEC of
rules and regulations necessary or appropriate in the public interest orforthe
protection ofinvestors. This language "implies the availability ofjudicial relief
where necessary to achieve that result." 6' Justice Clark also stated that private
enforcement of the proxy rules provided a necessary supplement to SEC action, and called attention to the SEC's inability to examine the factual accuracy of the proxy statements required to be filed and the unlikelihood that the
SEC could detect violations of the law prior to effectuation of the merger. He
concluded that these three factors showed that Congress intended to create a
private right of action and some remedy when it enacted section 14(a). It is
also reasonably clear from the opinion that the Court viewed these factors as
supporting the implication of a right of action as opposed to the implication of
a particular remedy.
Justice Clark did not apply the reasoning then being used by the lower
federal courts to support implication of a private right of action from the securities acts-the tort theory and the existence of a voidability provision in the
Exchange Act. The only bases the Court gave for recognizing a right of action
were found in its recognition of the remedial purposes underlying enactment
of section 14(a) and the important role that private enforcement could play in
exacting compliance with the statute.
Specifically addressing the question of relief, the Court found that courts
had broad latitude to devise remedies, and cited cases holding that when the
federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction and a cognizable right of action
exists, there is judicial power to fashion a remedy that effectuates the right
the Court cited Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). Borak, 377 U.S. at
434. In Lincoln Mills the Court had construed § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976), which provides generally for jurisdiction in the federal courts, to
authorize the courts to create a federal common law of labor relations by defining the duties and
the rights of the persons subject to the legislation. See Bickel and Wellington, Legislative Purpose
andthe JudicialProcess: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1, 35-38 (1957). Section 14(a)
is not analogous to § 301. If any section of the Exchange Act is analogous to § 301, it is § 27, the
jurisdictional provision. The effect of the Borak Court's citation to Lincoln Mills has thus been to
engender confusion about whether the Court believed that § 27 could itself be the source of sub-

stantive rights.
60. Borak, 377 U.S. at 431.
61. Id at 432.
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being enforced. 62 The opinion does not indicate that evidence of congres-

sional intent to create aparticularremedy must be present. While the availability of any particular remedy would depend on a determination that a statute
or the Constitution did not preclude its use, the opinion finds no such congressional intent limiting the available remedies under a right of action implied

from section 14(a). To the contrary, the Court found that the reference in
section 27, the jurisdictional section, to suits in equity as well as actions at law
supported its proposition that Congress intended to give the courts wide latitude in devising remedies in cases in which section 14(a) violations are established. 63 The Court's discussion of the three factors supporting the theory that

a private right of action existed, as well as its separate discussion of the availability of a remedy, supports interpreting Borak as recognizing that implying a
right of action and implyig a remedy are analytically severable issues.
The Court's failure to articulate the distinctions between what a court

does when it implies a right of action and what it does when it fashions a
remedy is curious and unfortunate. It may be that the Court felt that the

power of the federal courts to imply rights of action was so well established
that there was no need to mention specifically the sources of the courts' power
to so do.64 This seems to have been the assumption in most of the commentary generated immediately after the opinion. Writers focused on the Court's
handling of the remedies and federalism questions, virtually ignoring the
Court's justification for judicial power to imply a right of action, regardless of
62. See supra note 27 and cases cited therein. The Borak opinion does not make clear that
the Court was aware that the cases it cited for this proposition were concerned only with the
judicial power to fashion remedies as opposed to the power to imply rights of action. Nevertheless, an argument can be made that the Court was aware of the distinction. The cases are cited in
the section of the opinion that begins as follows: "We, therefore, believe that under the circumstances here it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to
make effective the congressional purpose." Borak, 377 U.S. at 433. But see Cannon v. University
of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 735 n.6 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("None of the authorities cited in
[Borak] supports the result.").
63. Although it is tempting to do so, all of the Court's references to § 27 cannot be explained
by its desire to show that Congress intended the federal courts to have subject matter jurisdiction
over suits seeking equitable as well as legal relief. The reference in the jurisdictional provision to
both could not mean that Congress intended in all cases for all forms of relief to be available. As
the Court later pointed out in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), a jurisdictional provision creates no cause of action of its own force and effect. Nevertheless, in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), the Court held that the absence of
reference to actions at law in the jurisdictional provision of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940,
15 U.S.C. § 80b-I to -21 (1982), precluded the federal courts from fashioning any form of nonequitable relief to remedy violations of that Act.
64. Indeed, Professor Louis Loss argues that while individual members of Congress may or
may not have enacted the Exchange Act with the implicit understanding that the courts would
allow private parties to sue to recover damages resulting from injuries sustained as a result of
violations of the statute, the drafters of the legislation would certainly have been aware of the
courts' powers in this area. 2 L. Loss, supra note 28,. at 942.
The failure of the Supreme Court to discuss either the tort or the voidability theories in Borak
has led to some of the confusion regarding the references in the opinion to § 27. The tort and
voidability theories had been offered by the lower federal courts as explanations for the sources of
the power to imply causes of action. If the Supreme Court had expressly acknowledged or rejected either or both of the theories, the ensuing discussion would undoubtedly have revealed
whether § 27 was viewed as the source of power to imply a right of action or merely the source of
the court's subject matter jurisdiction to entertain cases based on a right of action implied from the
Exchange Act.
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remedy. 6 5
On the other hand, the Court may have felt that the power to imply a
right of action and the power to provide a remedy once a right of action was
recognized were analogous. To a certain extent, judicial procedures used
when implying rights of action and remedies are analogous; the analogy, however, is not perfect. Both are inferred to be the necessary consequence of express statutory language. When implying a right of action the court
determines that a statute specifies certain duties and obligations that are judicially enforceable by the person asserting them. Only if it recognizes a right of
action is it necessary to reach the question of available remedies. The right to
invoke the power of the court to enforce a duty or obligation can exist, however, even though the particular remedy sought is unavailable, either because
it is precluded by the express terms of the statute or because
the plaintiff fails
66
remedy.
that
to
him
entitle
would
that
facts
establish
to
The Borak decision has been described as reaching "the right result not
for the wrong reason but for no reason at all. ' ' 67 Indeed the result was predictable. Supreme Court precedent existed for implying rights of action, albeit in
non-securities cases,68 and the lower courts had established the practice of implying rights of action in securities cases. 69 The unanimity of the opinion can
65. See, e.g., Note, Violations of Proxy Rules: Private Right of Action: Retrospective Relief.J.I. Case v. Borak, 50 CORNELL L. REv. 370 (1965); Recent Developments--SEC Proxy Regulations.- PrivateEnforcement and FederalRemedies, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1336 (1964); The Supreme
Court, 1963 Term-Governmental Regulations-Securities Regulations, 78 HARV. L. REV. 292
(1964); Recent Decisions-Corporations-StockholdersMay ObtainRetrospective as Well as Declaratory Relief Under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 838. But see
Note, J.I. Case v. Borak, CivilLiabilityandAppropriateRemedies Under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 809 (1965) (examining the theories supporting
judicial power to imply a cause of action). Most of the opinions were concerned with the implications of the interplay of federal remedies for proxy violations with state law that traditionally had
governed corporate proxy procedures.
66. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 240 n.18 (1979) ("A plaintiff may have a cause of
action even though he be entitled to no relief at all, as, for example, when a plaintiff sues for
declaratory or injunctive relief although his case does not fulfill the 'preconditions' for such equitable remedies.") (citing Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 440-43 (1977)).
67. L. Loss, supra note 10, at 1064.
68. See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (in personam
relief implied despite Act's specific remedies for negligently sinking a vessel); United States v.
Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960) (injunctive relief for removal of "structures" impliedly
provided for removal of "obstructions" in rivers); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (Railway
Labor Act impliedly allows for judicial remedies when administrative remedies are unavailable).
69. In 1961 Professor Loss stated that:
The existence of a private remedy under Rule lOb-5 has now been recognized by four
Courts of Appeals, with a favorable dictum in another, [Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co.,
188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Speed v.
Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956); Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th
Cir. 1956); Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960);
Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960); Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins.
Co., 174 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1949) (dictum); Beury v. Beury, 222 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1955)
(dictum); and Reed v. Riddle Airlines, 266 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1959)] and also by several
District Courts in other circuits. [Fifth-Third Union Trust Co. v. Block, S.D. Ohio, Civ.
No. 1507, Dec. 11, 1946; Hawkins v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp.
104 (W.D. Ark. 1949); Grand Lodge of International Ass'n of Machinists v. Highfield,
D.D.C., Civ. No. 3661-48, Jan. 24, 1949; Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp.,

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

only be taken as evidence of the Court's view that implication was an appro-

priate function for the federal courts. Indeed, the source of the power to imply
a right of action is clearly present in Borak (ie., the remedial purposes Con-

gress sought to accomplish by enacting the legislation and the rights and duties
created by section 14(a)). The right result does not, however, obviate the need

for analysis. The Court did not adopt either the tort or voidability theories to
support its result and offered nd-analytical substitute. It did not explain the
source of a court's power to imply a right of action, citing Supreme Court
precedent that permitted courts to imply remedies without making clear that
70
the power was not dispositive of the power to imply rights of action.
The next case in which the Supreme Court was presented with an issue
involving a private cause of action implied from a federal securities statute
was Mills v. Electric Auto-Lie Co. 7 1 Mills provided an opportunity for the
Court to address the effect, if any, of section 29(b) of the Exchange Act on the

propriety of implying rights of action and remedies. Section 29(b), 72 which
declares that contracts made in violation of the Exchange Act or a rule there-

under are "void" as regards the rights of the violator, had not before been held
by the Court to create implicitly a private right of action. Without directly
addressing the question, the Court impliedly recognized such a right by holding, in accordance with a number of lower courts, that section 29(b) renders a

contract merely voidable at the option of the innocent party, rather than as
mandating that the agreement, entered into in violation of the act, be consid-

ered void. 73 Viewing the statutory language as merely making such an agreement voidable instead of void requires that an implied private cause of action
based on section 29(b) be recognized, because in order to void the contract, the
103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Ill. 1952); Taylor v. Janigan, D. Mass., Civ. No. 58-I056-M, Apr.
16, 1959; Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D.
Ky. 1960).]
3 L. Loss, supra note 28, at 1763.
Similarly, numerous lower federal courts had by 1961 held that private actions could be
maintained under the Exchange Act proxy rules. 1 L. Loss, supra note 28, at 932-46.
70. The cases cited in Borak, which hold that the federal courts have broad latitude to fashion (imply) remedies, all involved remedies for expressly created rights of action. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317
U.S. 173 (1942); Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940). Seemingly there
would be no reason to restrict judicial flexibility to fashion relief because the cause of action is
implied rather than expressly created. No distinction is made in Borak.
71. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
72. Section 29(b) provides in part:
Every contract made in violation of any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder, and every contract (including any contract for listing a security on
an exchange) heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of which involves the violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or practice in violation of, any provision
of this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder, shall be void (1) as regards the rights
of any person who, in violation of any such provision, rule, or regulation, shall have
made or engaged in the performance of any such contract, and (2) as regards the rights of
any person who, not being a party to such contract, shall have acquired any right thereunder with actual knowledge of the facts by reason of which the making or performance
of such contract was in violation of any such provision, rule, or regulation . ...
15 U.S.C. 78cc(b) (1982).
73. Mills, 396 U.S. at 387.
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innocent party would have to bring an action against the securities law violator. The primary reasons given by courts for recognizing a private right to
enforce section 29(b) are that regarding the contract as void rather than merely
voidable would create the possibility of hardship for the innocent party, and
would fail to advance the statutory policy of disclosure that underlies the Exchange Act.74
Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act was also at issue in Mills, but instead of
reexamining whether an action could be implied from that section, the Court
addressed the necessity of showing causation to recover in such an action. The
Court assumed the ability to imply a cause of action from section 14(a), presumably because of its holding in Borak.75 In Mills it was merely defining the
contents of the
cause of action by looking at the substantive rights granted in
76
section 14(a).
Superintendent of Insurance v. Banker's Life and Casualy Co. ,77 which
74. See id at 388.

75. In Mills the Court again stressed what it believed to be the congressional intent underlyigthe enactment of§ 14(a): "to promote 'the free exercise of the voting rights of stockholders' by
ensuring that proxies would be solicited with an 'explanation to the stockholder of the real nature
of the questions for which authority to cast his vote is sought.'" Mills, 396 U.S. at 381 (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934)). Similarly, the Court reaffirmed its adherence
to the views first announced in Borak that private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a
necessary supplement to SEC action and that failure to recognize an implied cause of action
would result in the frustration of congressional intent. Id. at 382. In Mills, however, the Court
went on to state that "[i]n devising retrospective relief for violation of the proxy rules, the federal
courts should consider the same factors that would govern the relief granted for any similar illegality or fraud." Id at 386. In making this statement, the Court did not distinguish between the
types of relief available under an implied as opposed to an express cause of action. The Court
reaffirmed the inherent power of the federal courts to provide adequate relief when a statutory
duty is violated, bound only by the "sound discretion which guides the determinations of courts of
equity." Id
The Court did not refer to § 27 as the source of or a limitation on the courts' power to devise
remedies. Mills thus provides support for the view that § 27 was not considered the source of the
federal courts' power to do so; rather, such power is inherent in the courts. The issue before the
Borak Court was restated in Mills, omitting any reference to § 27, thus lending further support to
this view. As stated by the Mills Court, the inquiry in Borak was limited "to whether a violation
of § 14(a) gives rise to 'a federal cause of action for rescission or damages." Id at 383 (quoting
Borak, 377 U.S. at 428).
76. In the concluding section of the opinion, the Court dealt with the question whether attorneys' fees could be awarded in a suit brought under § 14(a). Although the issue is outside the
scope of this Article, several ideas discussed by the Court while resolving the issue have direct
bearing on the implication question. First, the Court held that "[tihe absence of express statutory
authorization for an award of attorneys' fees in a suit under § 14(a) [did] not preclude such an
award." Mills, 396 U.S. at 390. As support for its position, the Court cited the longstanding
practice of the lower federal courts to award attorneys' fees in suits brought by shareholders to
recover short-swing profits for their corporation under § 16(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(b) (1982), despite the lack of any provision for them in § 16(b). See, e.g., Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943). The lower courts did not find Congress' inclusion of
express provisions for recovery of attorneys' fees in suits brought under other sections of the Act to
in any way impinge upon the result reached under § 16(b) in the absence of statutory authorization, and the Supreme Court agreed that the existence of specific provisions should not be read as
denying to the courts the power to award counsel fees in suits under other sections of the Act. The
Court also found no reason to infer a purpose from the Exchange Act to circumscribe the courts'
power to grant appropriate remedies. Mills, 396 U.S. at 390. The Court's rejection of the expressio
unius est exclusio alerius maxim of statutory construction was not to be its last word on the subject, however. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
77. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).

NORTH CAROLINA LA.W REVIEW[o

[Vol. 62

was decided a year and one-half later, is in the same analytical mode as Mills.
Writing for a unanimous Court in Banker's Life, Justice Douglas somewhat
cryptically provided Supreme Court recognition for an implied cause of action
based on section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. Plaintiff brought a private action
based on a violation of section 10(b). 78 The Court's entire discussion of the
implication issue is contained in a footnote, in which the Court stated in full:
"It is now established that a private right of action is implied under Section
10(b)."179 The remainder of the opinion deals with the elements of the implied

cause of action.
Banker's Life, although bereft of analysis, nevertheless has been cited authority for implying private actions in almost every one of the subsequent decisions addressing the issue. The Court made no attempt to compare or
contrast the purposes underlying enactment of section 10(b) with those of section 14(a), the statute involved in Borak; nor did it address the scope of the
courts' authority to devise remedies when a violation of section 10(b) is
proved. Although the Banker's Life opinion cited Borak, it did not expressly
reaffirm the bases for implication that were arguably set out in Borak-it can
only be assumed they were reaffirmed.
After Banker's Life, the Supreme Court did not decide another implication case involving any of the securities acts until 1975, when it decided Securities InvestorProtection Corp. v. Barbour.80 Because the Court did not imply a

cause of action in Barbour, the case is frequently viewed as a retrenchment or
contraction from the Court's previous implication decisions, although in fact it
is not.8 1 The Court merely distinguished Borak on a sound basis.
Unlike Borak, Mills, and Banker's Lfe,Barbour did not arise under the

Exchange Act but involved a dispute regarding the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA).8 2 SIPA is a narrowly focused act that provides for
the establishment of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) as
a nonprofit involuntary membership corporation for the purpose of providing
financial relief to customers of failing broker-dealers with whom cash or secur78. Plaintiffalso alleged violations of§ 17(a) ofthe Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)
(1982). Banker's L fe, 404 U.S. at 7. The Supreme Court did not discuss the § 17(a) claim.
79. Banker's Lffe, 404 U.S. at 13 n.9. As authority for this statement the Court cited its
opinions in Techerepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967), and Borak, as well as the discussion of
§ 10(b) liability in Professor Loss' treatise on securities regulation, 3 L. Loss, supra note 28, at
1763-97. Techerepnin required the Court to construe the definition of the term "security" set forth
in the Exchange Act, and thus the Court did not have any opportunity to directly address the
question whether § 10(b) provided a private right of action. The Borak opinion also did not
discuss § 10(b). Although the section of Professor Loss' treatise the Court cited points out that the

majority of lower court decisions had upheld implication of a private cause of action based upon
§ 10(b), the text generally deals with the elements of a private action under § 10(b) instead of the

basis for implication.
The Court's footnote appears in a quotation from Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 827 (5th
Cir. 1970), a case in which the Fifth Circuit recognized an implied cause of action based on

§ 10(b).
80. 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
81. The term "contraction era" is used by Professor Bromberg to describe the Supreme
Court's securities implication decisions that post-date Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See 1 A.
BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIEs FRAUD & COMMODITIEs FRAUD § 2.4, at 310 (1982).
82. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78ll (1982).
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ities had been left on deposit. Pursuant to the Act, when the SIPC determines
that a member organization has failed or is in danger of failing to meet its
obligations to customers, it may file an application with a United States district court for a decree adjudicating that customers of the member firm are in
need of the protection provided by SIPA.8 3 If the court finds any of the four
conditions on which an SIPC application may be based,8 4 it must grant the
application, issue the decree, and appoint a trustee for the liquidation of the
business.85 The SEC has a number of responsibilities and powers under SIPA,
including the right to seek a judicial decree requiring the SIPC to discharge its
86
statutory obligations.
Barbour arose after the SEC had filed a complaint in district court against
a registered broker-dealer. The complaint sought to enjoin continued violation of the SEC's rules, and requested that a receiver be appointed by the court
to wind up the broker-dealer's affairs. The court granted the injunction and
appointed the receiver. The respondent, the receiver appointed by the court,
subsequently obtained an order directing the SEC and SIPC to show cause
why the remedies afforded by SIPA should not be made available in the proceedings. The SIPC challenged the receiver's standing to compel its intervention. The district court upheld the receiver's right of action, but denied
relief.87 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of
relief and affirmed the recognition of the receiver's right to bring suit.88 The
appellate court specifically rejected the SIPC's argument that the provision in
SIPA for SEC enforcement actions to compel the SIPC to perform its functions was meant to exclude such actions by protected customers or their
89
representatives.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the customers of an SIPCmember broker-dealer have no implied right to sue to compel the SIPC to
perform its statutory functions. 90 The Court stated that implication of a private cause of action must be consistent with the legislative intent of the statute
and that private enforcement must further the statutory purposes. The Court
determined that Congress had created the SIPC to perform a public service,
had provided for substantial supervision of its operations by an agency
charged with protection of the public interest, and had authorized that agency
to seek judicial action to enforce the obligations of the corporation. While the
Court recognized that Congress' primary purpose for enacting SIPA and creating the SIPC was to protect investors, it found that allowing a private cause of
83. Id § 78eee(a)(3).
84. Id § 78eee(a)(1)(A)-(D).
85. Id § 78eee(b)(1)-(3).

86. Id § 78ggg(b).
87. SEC v. Guaranty Bond & Sec. Corp., 496 F.2d 145, 146-47 (6th Cir. 1974) (citing the
district court opinion), rev'dsub nom Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S.

412 (1975).
88. Id at 150.

89. Id
90. Barbour, 421 U.S. at 425. The Court, therefore, did not reach the issue of the receiver's
standing to assert such a right.
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action by the investors was not necessary or even capable of furthering that

purpose. 9 1 The Court concluded that the overall structure and purpose of
SIPA reflected a basic incompatibility with implication of a cause of action.
The lack of any indication in the legislative history of congressional intent to
create such a right bolstered this conclusion.

The Barbour Court distinguished Borak on the ground that implication of
a cause of action under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act was premised on a
belief that private enforcement was necessary to effectuate the broad remedial

purposes of the proxy rules. It gave no indication that either the Borak result
or its reasoning were faulty or superceded. 92 The Court simply thought that
93
the two statutes were different.
The Barbour opinion does not make clear what the Court meant when it

stated that implication must be consistent with the legislative intent in enacting the statute. By a process of elimination, however, the Court's reasoning
apparently is based on the theory that intent is the same as substantive legislative purpose. 94 Clearly, if the statute had included language expressly pre-

cluding or allowing private causes of action there would have been nothing for
the Court to decide. It also seems apparent that if the legislative history had
indicated that Congress had assumed there would or would not be private
enforcement, the Court would have held accordingly. Assuming the federal

courts have the power to imply private causes of action and that Congress
91. d at 421. The Court based its conclusion, in part, on the need to maintain public confidence in the capital markets as well as to protect the customers of the failing firm. Saving the firm
by an infusion of capital or by merging it with another firm might be a better means of doing both.
A customer was thought not to have enough public information to adequately consider the public
interest, if indeed such interest would be considered, when making a decision to apply to the court.
Id at 422.
92. Id at 423-24. The Court also distinguished its 1969 decision in Allen v. Virginia State
Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). Barbour, 421 U.S. at 424. The question decided in theAllen
case, which arose under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973p (1976), was
whether a private citizen could sue to set aside a state or local election law on the ground that it
was repugnant to the Act. The Act provided that the attorney general could bring such suits but
was silent about the rights of others to do so. In Barbour the Supreme Court stated that it was
clear to the Allen Court that the Voting Rights Act would be practically unenforceable against the
many local governments subject to its provisions if the attorney general were the only one authorized to sue, and therefore it was consistent with the broad purposes of the Act to allow an individual citizen standing to ensure that his city or county government complies with the requirements
of the Act. Barbour, 421 U.S. at 424-25 (citing Allen, 393 U.S. at 557). No similar incapacity on
the part of the governmental agency and self-regulatory organizations charged with enforcement
of SIPA was found.
93. See Barbour, 421 U.S. at 425. The Court held that the issue before it in Barbour was very
similar to that before it in National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers,
414 U.S. 453 (1974) (Amtrak). Barbour, 421 U.S. at 420. InAmtrak the Supreme Court held that
private injunctive relief could not be obtained under the provision of the Rail Passenger Service
Act of 1970, because the legislative history of the Act was entirely consonant with a holding that
no private cause of action was intended; the structure and purpose of the Act further supported
that conclusion; the Act's purposes would be hindered by recognition of a private cause of action;
Congress had provided sufficient means for enforcing the Act without resort to private suit; and
the absence of a private cause of action would not leave Amtrak free to disregard the public
interest in its decisionmaking. Barbour, 414 U.S. at 462.
94. Barbour, 421 U.S. at 418. Professor Loss equates legislative intent with statutory purpose. See L. Loss, supra note 10, at 1103. It is not at all clear, however, that the Supreme Court is
ready to adopt the equation.

1984]

IMPLIED CA USES OFACTION

knows of this power, "intent" as used by the Barbour Court must mean Congress' purpose in enacting the statute, not Congress' intent to allow private
parties to sue.
Barbour did not address separately the questions of implying a right of
action and implying a remedy. 95 Although the Court framed the question in
terms of whether an implied private right of action for a particular remedy
existed, 96 the Court's analysis did not focus on the remedy. The Court in effect held that SIPA did not create substantive rights or duties, or impose standards of conduct, that were capable of private enforcement. Thus, there was
no procedural need to imply a private right of action. Absent a finding that a
private right of action existed, there 97
was no opportunity or need for the Court
to examine the question of remedy.
Between 1964 and 1975, there was no analysis of sources of power. It was
generally assumed that the federal courts possessed the power to imply causes
of action. The Supreme Court's decisions were supported in part by the lower
courts' widespread use of the tort and voidability theories to support implication. In turn, Borak and its progeny prompted the lower federal courts to
expansively imply causes of action, not only from the securities laws, but also
from many other federal statutes. 98 It was therefore inevitable that the pendulum would swing too far. In fact it did, and Cori v. Ash99 was the Supreme
Court's response to this expansion.
B. Cort v. Ash: Defning Intent
Cases dealing with the implied causes of action issue must be classified as
either pre- or post-Cort v. Ash, the 1975 decision in which Justice Brennan,
writing for a unanimous Court, set forth a four part test for determining
whether a private cause of action could be implied from a statute not expressly
providing one. Cort, decided the same term as Barbour, was an obvious attempt to reconcile earlier implication decisions. Although written to be, and
heralded as, a definitive guide for answering the question, the Cort test did not
long survive.
Cort did not involve a securities statute. Instead, section 610 of the 1948
Election Act, 10 a criminal statute prohibiting corporations from making contributions or expenditures in connection with presidential elections was the
95. Subject matter jurisdiction apparently was not challenged.
96. As stated by the Court, the question presented was whether customers of a failing brokerdealer "have an implied private right of action under the Securities Investor Protection Act of
1970. . . , to compel the SIPC to exercise its statutory authority for their benefit." Barbour, 421
U.S. at 413-14.
97. The fact that the subject matter jurisdictional provisions of SIPA were limiting and that
there were no provisions in the statute creating a private right of action for any purpose supported
the Court's determination that the particular action asserted and remedy sought could not be
maintained or granted. See id at 424-25.
98. See, e.g., the United States courts of appeals' decisions cited in Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 675, 741-42 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
99. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
100. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 610, 62 Stat. 718, 723 (repealed 1976).
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proposed statutory basis for the implied cause of action. The issue was raised
in a derivative suit brought by a shareholder of a corporation whose officers
and directors allegedly had caused the corporation to violate the statute.10 1
In holding that a private cause of action to secure derivative damage relief could not be implied from section 610, the Court cited four relevant fac-

tors, phrased as questions, that were to be used in resolving implication
cases: 102

First, .. does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or deny one? Third, is it
consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme to
imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?.

.

. And finally, is the cause

of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically
the concern of the states, so that it would be 1inappropriate
to infer a
03
cause of action based solely on federal law?

The Court did not find that any of the factors supported implying a private cause of action from section 610. It did not find any intention to create a
federal right in the plaintiff shareholders; rather, it found that the protection of
ordinary stockholders was only a secondary concern of Congress when it enacted the statute. 1 4 The Court contrasted this secondary concern with other
situations in which an implied cause of action was recognized-statutes or
constitutional provisions that clearly articulate a federal right in the plainbetween
tiff'0 5 or "pervasive legislative scheme[s] governing the relationship
06
the plaintiff class and the defendant class in a particular regard."'
When discussing the importance of legislative intent, the Court noted that
it is not necessary to show affirmative congressional intent to create a private
cause of action in order to uphold implication, although an explicit purpose to
101. The shareholder sought an injunction against further corporate expenditures in connection with election campaigns as well as compensatory and punitive damages in favor of the corporation. The Supreme Court held that injunctive relief was inappropriate because the Federal
Election Campaign Act had been amended in 1974 to provide a statutory remedy for injunctive
relief and, since it was the duty of the Court to decide the case in accordance with the law existing
at the time of decision, the respondent was bound to pursue the new procedure with respect to
alleged violations that had not yet occurred. Cori, 422 U.S. at 77.
102. Id at 78. The four factors are identified in the opinion as being relevant to determining
whether a private "remedy" is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one. Arguably, the
term "remedy" as used by the Court combines the concepts of implied private right of action and
implied relief. For purposes of consistency, this case will continue to be discussed in terms of the
propriety of implying a private cause of action rather than implying a remedy.
103. Id (citations omitted). The Court uses the term "right" in the first factor, "remedy" in
the second two, and "cause of action" in the fourth. Id While it would be tempting to argue that
the second and third factors (legislative intent and consistency with the underlying purpose of the
legislative scheme) should be limited to determining what relief should be granted, it seems clear
that the Court did not intend such a result and it has not applied such an analysis in the later
implication decisions.
104. Id at 80.
105. Id at 82 (citing, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and Texas Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916)). The Court's
citation to Bivens is the first time the Court had cited a constitutional implication case or a case
clearly based on the tort theory of implication in a securities act implied cause of action case.
106. Id (citing, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)).
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deny a cause of action would be controlling. Nevertheless, stated the Court,

when there is no suggestion that Congress intended to vest in the plaintiff class
rights broader than those provided by state regulation of corporations, the ab-

sence in the legislative history of any suggestion of an intention to provide a
private cause of action reinforces the view that no such action can be
10 7
implied.
The Court dispensed with the third factor by holding that the recovery of

derivative damages by the corporation would not aid the primary congressional goal, to decrease or cure the impact of such funds on federal elections.
The Court also held that in the situation before it, it was entirely appropriate

to limit the respondent to a state law remedy. Unlike the situation in Borak,
committing the respondent to state remedies would not have the effect of frus-

trating the congressional purposes in enacting section 610.108
Throughout its discussion of the second, third, and fourth factors, the

Court clearly was addressing the propriety of implying a right of action to
obtain a specific remedy-money damages. 10 9 Indeed, in its summation para-

graph, the Court emphasized that the question of injunctive relief was not

before it. 100 The Court reasoned in effect that money damages were an inap-

propriate remedy, and therefore a right of action to obtain such damages could
not be implied.
Although it is arguable that the right of action question should have been
answered first, the Court's failure to do so is supportable on the grounds that
judicial economy requires that the narrower question be decided first. Even if
the institutional preference for the more narrow decisional basis were the reason for the Court's focus on remedy, the opinion does not make clear whether
the four factors were intended to be used to answer the right of action question
or the remedy question. If one or more of the factors really should be used

only to determine whether a right of action exists, its use when answering the
remedy question may have the effect of restricting the power of the federal
107. Id. The Court was later to make clear that, similarly, even if express private causes of
action are included in a statute, such inclusion does not necessarily evidence an intent to preclude
implication of other causes of action.
108. See id at 84. Cf.id at 82-84 (when dubious congressional intent to vest rights broader
than state regulations, absence of civil cause of action indicates expectation that area will continue
to be controlled by states). In both Borak and Banker's Life the Supreme Court found occasion to
discuss the impact of state law on the implication question. In Barak the Court was faced with the
argument that questions of state law would have to be interpreted and applied in order to grant
the relief sought by the plaintiffs in that action, and that the Court should not, therefore, imply a
private cause of action. The Borak Court held, however, that the entire purpose of the proxy
regulation provisions of the Exchange Act might be frustrated if the federal courts refused to grant
remedial relief for violations of the federal statute. Borak, 377 U.S. at 434-35. In Banker's Life,
the Court held that once a violation of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act was established, the
plaintiff was entitled to redress "whatever might be available as a remedy under state law."
Banker's Lfe, 404 U.S. at 12. In neither of these cases nor in Cort did the Court enter into a
discussion of the constitutional distribution of judicial power between the states and the federal
government, nor did it discuss the nonconstitutional aspects of the federalism concept. Only in
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), a case not cited in Cort, was the
federalism question addressed directly.
109. See supra note 103.
110. Cort, 422 U.S. at 85.
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courts to fashion remedies, a power previously considered to be quite flexible
and expansive.
The reverse situation may also be true. Because the federal courts arguably have greater power to fashion remedies than to imply rights, the Court
may have formulated one or more of the factors in an attempt to identify an
intent on the part of Congress to restrict judicial power to fashion remedies.
Absent a finding of congressional intent to restrict the courts' power, the courts
may provide a remedy. While the absence of a negative restriction on a particular remedy may give the courts a free hand to imply such a remedy, the
failure of Congress to preclude implying rights of action does not similarly
empower the courts to imply such rights.
In listing the four factors, Justice Brennan used the word "remedy" when
describing the second and third criteria (discerning legislative intent and consistency with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme), while the
opinion speaks generally of inferring a cause of action. In later cases intent
was to become the key factor-the only factor for some members of the
Court-for resolving the right of action component in the cause of action
equation."1 ' If Justice Brennan's use of the term "remedy" was intentional,
then discerning legislative intent may have been meant to be relevant to determining the appropriate remedy, and not relevant, or at least not relevant in the
same way, when determining whether a private right of action exists.
Although it did not recognize a private cause of action in Cort, and used a
novel analytical method, the Court did not disavow the bases previously recognized for implying private causes of action. The Court at least inferentially
reaffirmed the inherent power of courts to provide a remedy for a wrong and
the propriety of providing private enforcement mechanisms to further the accomplishment of discerned statutory goals. Cort, then, like Borak, really gave
no basis for predicting the likelihood of the implication of additional causes of
action under the federal securities acts. Although Cort purported to provide a
refined analytical framework for determining when private causes of action
would be inferred, the case law remained as muddled after the decision as it
was before. While many commentators viewed the case as restricting the ability of the federal courts to imply causes of action,112 the lower federal courts
3
continued to do so."1
Two securities cases decided by the Supreme Court soon after Cort did
not provide a better or more workable analysis for implying a cause of acI 11. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979); Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979). These cases are discussed infra text accompanying
notes 149-165 and 166-192 respectively.
112. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 3; Note, Implication ofPrivateActions From FederalSatu/es." From Borak to Ash, 1 J. CORP. L. 371 (1976); Note, Private Right of Action Not To Be
Impliedfrom FederalCorrupt PracticesAct, 50 TUL. L. REV. 713 (1976); Note, Implied Private
FederalActionNotAvailable Under 18 U.SC.§ 610 Wen It WouldIntrudeon Area Traditionally
Committed to State Law Without Asking the Main Purpose of the Act, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 447
(1976); Recent Decision, Implied Cause of Action-No Remedy Available Under FederalElection
CampaignAct, 47 Miss. L.J. 156 (1976).
113. See supra note 98.
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tion.114 It was unnecessary. for the Court to deal directly with the issue, however, because these cases clearly raised different, albeit subsidiary, issues-the
availability of a particular remedy and standing.
C

Post-Cort v. Ash: The Court Waffles

In Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.115 a corporation brought an action
against a shareholder to enjoin him from voting or pledging his shares and
from acquiring additional shares, and to require him to divest himself of the
shares that he already owned. Plaintiff asserted section 13(d) of the Exchange
Act'" 6 as the basis for the action. Section 13(d) was added to the Exchange
Act in 1968 as part of the Williams Act. The Williams Act consisted of a
number of provisions designed generally to regulate tender offers, which had
not been directly regulated at the federal level. Section 13(d) requires the purchaser of more than five percent of the shares of a corporation whose shares
are required to be registered with the SEC to. file a statement describing the
purchase. The statement must be filed with the SEC within ten days after the
acquisition.
Plaintiff Mosinee Paper Corporation claimed that defendant's failure to
comply with the disclosure requirements of section 13(d) was a scheme to defraud the corporation and its shareholders. Defendant, who had filed the disclosure schedule about three months late, contended that his admitted
violation of section 13(d) resulted from his ignorance of the securities laws,
and that neither the corporation nor its other shareholders had been harmed.
After three months of pretrial proceedings defendant moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion, ruling defendant did not engage in intentional covert and conspiratorial conduct in failing to file the statement on time and that plaintiff had not shown the irreparable harm necessary
to support an injunction. 117 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed, holding that a showing of irreparable harm is not a prerequisite to
obtaining permanent injunctive relief. The court based its holding on its belief
that an issuer of securities, the corporation, is in the best position to ensure
timely and complete compliance with the filing requirements of the Exchange
Act by pursuing injunctive actions even if permanent harm had not been suf18
fered, and to obtain speedy and forceful remedial action when necessary.
The Supreme Court reversed. Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority
opinion, from which Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall dissented. As
framed by the Court, the issue before it was whether the record supported the
grant of an injunction, a remedy whose basis "in the federal courts has always
114. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422'
U.S. 49 (1975).
115. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).

116. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982).
117. Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 354 F. Supp. 686 (1973), rev'd, 500 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir.
1974), rev'd, 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
118. Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 500 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1974), rey'd, 422 U.S. 49
(1975).
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The Court con-

cluded that the corporate plaintiff and its shareholders had not been harmed
by defendant's violation and that none of the evils addressed by section 13(d)
had occurred or was threatened.

The Court did not decide whether a private cause of action ever could be
implied from section 13(d), focusing instead on the narrower remedy question. 120 It noted that neither the availability of a private suit nor the corporation's standing to bring such a suit was before it, thereby suggesting that those
questions do not control the remedy question. Although acknowledging that it
had not hesitated to recognize the power of federal courts to fashion private

remedies for securities laws violations when to do so was consistent with the
legislative scheme and necessary to supplement SEC enforcement, the Court

stated that this power was not deemed to relieve a plaintiff of the burden of
establishing the traditional prerequisites to relief. A conclusion that a private
litigant could maintain an action for violation of the securities laws meant no
more than that traditional remedies would be available to redress any harm
suffered. The questions of liability and relief are separate. The relief awarded

must be determined according to traditional principles. Thus, unlike Borak,
Rondeau made clear that differences exist between implying rights of action
21

and fashioning remedies.'
The Court's reference to this dichotomy is both elucidating and confus-

ing. Although Rondeau was an implication of remedy case, the Court recognized a difference between implying a right of action and implying a remedy.
The Court did not, however, clearly identify the sources of the Court's power
to imply either a right of action or a remedy. Nevertheless, from the Court's

discussion it seems fair to infer that implying a right of action from a securities
119. fRondeau, 422 U.S. at 57 (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07
(1959)).
120. Id. A fair assumption, however, is that an implied cause of action exists. The Court
concluded that an injuction was not necessary to protect the interests of either the shareholders
who sold their stock to defendant at prediscIosure prices or those who would not have invested
had they known that a takeover bid might occur. Id. at 59-60. The Court stated that the shareholders who sold would have an adequate remedy by way of an action for damages, "thus negating the basis for equitable relief." Id. at 60. The Court did not say whether such an action could
be based on the alleged § 13(d) violation. Arguably the reference to a damage action indicates
approval of implying a private action from that section. The Supreme Court's silence on this
issue, however, may only indicate its belief that an action for damages was available based on
§ 10(b) of the Exchange Act, which had previously been found to support an implied right of
action in Banker's Lfe.
Furthermore, in regard to both groups of shareholders, the Court stated that it was not at all
clear that the type of harm identified by plaintiff would be addressable under the provisions of
§ 13(d), id, thus indicating that the Court was concerned more with the form of requested relief
than with whether a private cause of action for any type of relief could be implied. The Court's
silence has therefore led most commentators and some courts to conclude that if the appropriate
harm was shown, then an implied cause of action under section 13(d) could be maintained. See,
e.g., General Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90 (Ist Cir. 1977), in which the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit quoted Rondeau in connection with the issuance of a preliminary injunction for a violation of § 13(d). Id. at 96.
121. Compare General Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90 (1st Cir. 1977) (affirming grant
of temporary injunction based on violation of section 13(d)) with Myers v. American Leisure Time
Enters., 402 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aj'dmem., 538 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976) (no cause of
action for damages).
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statute will be permitted only when to do so is consistent with the legislative
scheme and necessary for the protection of investors as a supplement to SEC
enforcement. The Court's discussion strongly suggests, however, that once a
right of action is recognized, the Court has a freer hand in fashioning an appropriate remedy, unless Congress intended to limit the judicial power to fashion particular remedies by prescribing the type of relief that will be
available.' 2 2 Thus, unlike Borak, the Rondeau opinion expressly purports to
defer to Congress in determining when a right of action, as opposed to when a
remedy, will be inferred. In fact, Rondeau can be read as a strong reaffirmation of the federal courts' power to fashion remedies absent express congressional prohibition.
In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that by enacting section 13(d), Congress intended to preclude inquiry into the results of a violation when granting
relief.123 In support of this result and his argument, Justice Brennan noted
that the congressional objective could be gleaned from the purposes underlying enactment of the Williams Act, of which section 13(d) is a part. In Justice
Brennan's view, Congress intended that investors and management be notified
at the earliest possible moment of the potential for a shift in corporate control.
Violation of section 13(d) by itself established the actionable harm. Harm of
the type required by the majority would seldom, if ever, result from a violation
of a section 13(d), thus thwarting the congressional objective of requiring reporting within certain time periods. Unless a violator refused to comply after
the fact, there never could be harm that could not be remedied by damages.
Thus, injunctive relief was necessary for its in terrorem value and the majority
was in effect prohibiting its use in that context without any congressional directive to do so.
Some commentators viewed Rondeau as a retreat from the broad holdings
of Borak, Mills, and Banker's Life, which had supported the implication of
private causes of action.124 Rondeau, however, can be distinguished in at least
two ways. First, the remedy sought differed from that sought in the earlier
cases: plaintiff was seeking an injunction. Courts traditionally have great discretion in administering equitable relief. Since Rondeau was the first Supreme
Court securities law implication case in which the question of injunctive relief
was the main issue, the analysis was accordingly directed to that question.
Second, the statute upon which the plaintiff would ultimately have based his
implied right of action for injunctive relief was different from those involved
in the earlier securities implication cases. Section 13(d) has a narrower focus
and purpose. It sets up a reporting mechanism designed to provide the SEC
and corporations with information. By its own terms the section does not impose standards for conducting the actions that are required to be reported. In
122. The Court did not make clear that an express congressional prohibition of a particular
remedy would preclude its use by the federal courts but such a result cannot be seriously
questioned.
123. Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 65 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124. See, e.g., Porter & Hyland, Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Company and the Williams Act
Injunction, 59 MARQ. L. REv. 743 (1976).
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the absence of fraud or detrimental reliance on the failure to report, the criminal sanctions available for a willful failure to report arguably would be a sufficient incentive to ensure compliance.
It seems clear that when Rondeau was decided, the Court had not yet
reached a consensus in favor of restricting the implication of private causes of
action. It was instead attempting to define when particular remedies would be
fashioned absent express congressional direction, in the context of a narrowly
focused statute which contained criminal sanctions that permitted achievement of the results Congress wanted without the use of an injunction.
Two terms after the Court disposed of Barbour, Cort, and Rondeau, it
decided another case involving implication under a securities statute. Like
Rondeau, Piper v. Chris-CraftIndustries125 concerned a provision of the Wilhams Act. Chris-Craft Industries was the unsuccessful tender offeror in a contest for the control of Piper Aircraft Corporation. During the course of the
takeover contest, Chris-Craft brought suit for damages and injunctive relief
against the management of Piper, Piper's investment advisor, and Bangor
Punta Corporation, the successful tender offeror, alleging violations of section
14(e) of the Exchange Act. 126 Section 14(e) makes unlawful fraud, deception,
or manipulation in connection with tender offers or solicitations of securities
holders in opposition to or in favor of such offers.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, first noted that section
14(e) makes no express provision for a private cause of action. Recognizing
that it previously had held that a private cause of action could be implied from
sections 14(a)127 and 10(b) 12 8 of the Exchange Act even though those sections
contained no express civil liability provisions, 29 the Court stated that it found
an implied cause of action in those cases because the congressional purposes in
enacting them were likely to be undermined absent private enforcement. The
Chris-CraftCourt, therefore, found it necessary to examine the legislative history of section 14(e) to discern "the congressional purpose underlying the specific statutory prohibition."' 30 The Court did not understand the Cort test to
require determining whether Congress intended to allow private suits, but
rather whether Congress intended a purpose which could be effectuated only if
the Court allowed such suits. If the goal or purpose behind the statute could
not be accomplished effectively without allowing private suits, then the Court
125. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
126. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982). Chris-Craft also alleged violation of SEC rule lOb-6, 17
C.F.R. § 240.lOb-6 (1983). Rule lOb-6 prohibits issuers whose stock is in the process of distribution from tampering with the market by purchasing stock or stock rights until the distribution has
been completed.
127. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
128. Banker's Life, 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
129. Chris-Craft,430 U.S. at 25. The actual language used by the Court was as follows: "This
Court has nonetheless held that in some circumstances a private cause of action can be implied
with respect to the 1934 Act's antifraud provisions, even though the relevant provisions are silent
as to remedies." Id.
130. Id. at 26.
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3
would infer a private cause of action from the statute.1 '
The Court found that the sole purpose of the Williams Act was to protect
the shareholders of the target companies. 1 32 The Court also concluded that
there existed no purpose in section 14(e) that required recognition of a private

cause of action for damages on behalf of competing tender offerors.133 While
agreeing that Congress also intended to maintain the competitive balance be-

tween the target corporation and competing tender offerors, the Court refused
to categorize the desire on the part of Congress to maintain neutrality

34

as

either a purpose of the legislation or a basis for implying a cause of action
from section 14(e).
Chris-Craft, of course, held a dual position in the controversy being litigated. It was a tender offeror, and therefore a member of one of the groups

whose activities were intended to be regulated by the Williams Act. But
Chris-Craft was also a shareholder of Piper, having become one as a result of

its tender.135 The Court was thus faced with a dilemma-was Chris-Craft to
be treated as a shareholder or a tender offeror.

Chief Justice Burger ultimately concluded that even if a private cause of
action were available to shareholders of the target companies, Chris-Craft

could not be considered a shareholder for such purpose because it lacked
standing to assert such a claim.' 36 The majority purported to use the Cort test

to support its conclusion. It did not, however, use the test to determine
whether a private cause of action was implicit in section 14(e); the Court expressly declined to rule on that question.'

37

Instead, it used the Cort analysis

to determine whether Chris-Craft had standing to assert such an action, as131. [W]e must consider whether § 14(e), which is entirely silent as to private remedies,
permits this Court to read into the statute a damages remedy for unsuccessful tender
offerors. To resolve that question we turn to the legislative history to discern the congressional purpose underlying the specific statutory prohibition in § 14(e). Once we
identify the legislative purpose, we must then determine whether the creation by judicial
interpretation of the implied cause of action asserted by Chris-Craft is necessary to effectuate Congress' goals.
Id. at 25-26.
132. "The legislative history thus shows that the sole purpose of the Williams Act was the
protection of investors who are confronted with a tender offer." Id. at 35.
133. "We find no hint in the legislative history, on which respondent so heavily relies, that
Congress contemplated a private cause of action for damages by one of several contending offerors against a successful bidder or by a losing contender against the target corporation." Id.
134. Chris-Craft and the SEC asserted that, in enacting the Williams Act, Congress intended
to protect tender offerors as part of a pervasive scheme of federal regulation of tender offers. In
support of this position, they argued that in enacting the legislation, Congress intended to establish a policy of evenhandedness in takeover regulation. In response, the Court stated:
Congress was indeed committed to a policy of neutrality in contests for control, but its
policy of evenhandedness does not go either to the purpose of the legislation or to
whether a private cause of action is implicit in the statute. Neutrality is, rather, but one
characteristic of legislation directed toward a different purpose-the protection of
investors.
Id. at 29.
135. Chris-Craft had also purchased shares prior to making the tender offer. Id. at 5.
136. Id. at 42.
137. "Our holding is a limited one. Whether shareholder-offerees, the class protected by
§ 14(e), have an implied cause of action under § 14(e) is not before us, and we intimate no view on
that matter. Nor is the target corporation's standing to sue an issue in this case." Id. at 42 n.28.
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suming the action existed. Applying the test, the Court determined that ChrisCraft was not one for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, that the
legislative history, although ambiguous, did not support a cause of action in
favor of Chris-Craft, and that the legislative purposes underlying section 14(e)
would not be furthered by giving Chris-Craft the right to sue. 138
Although disagreeing with the result, Justice Stevens in dissent seemingly
accepted using the Cort test to resolve the question of Chris-Craft's standing.
Justice Stevens believed, however, that the majority misconstrued and misapplied the Cort test by attaching undue importance to its finding that tender
offerors do not belong to the special class Congress intended to benefit in enacting the Williams Act. He argued that the first Cort factor, whether the

plaintiffs are members of the class for whose special benefit the statute was
enacted, is not really an independent test. 139 Further, he found that the majority had substituted the necessity of finding a "pervasive legislative scheme" for
the concept of an "articulated
federal right in the plaintiff' that was described
40
1
in the Cort opinion.
In Chris-Craft the Court for the first time used the Cort test to resolve a

standing question, doing so without noting that it had not so used the test
before. In one sense, implying a cause of action always raises a question of
standing because the court is deciding whether anyone can sue, (i e., has stand-

ing to assert the claim).' 4 ' But it is possible for an express or implied cause of
action to exist, even though the particular plaintiff asserting it lacks standing.
There is nothing in Cort indicating that the four-part test was formulated to
resolve the latter, more narrow question. Nothing in Chris-Craftindicates that

the Court recognized a difference.' 42 The disagreement between Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Stevens would have little importance to an analysis of

when causes of action can be implied if, as Justice Stevens wrote, "No one
seriously questions the premise that Congress implicitly created a private right
138. Id. at 37-41.
139. Justice Stevens argued that it is not essential to the Cori test that the plaintiff belong to
the 'especial class.' All that is necessary is that the protection Congress sought to provide for that
class be furthered by recognition of the implied cause of action. Id. at 66-67 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
140. Id. at 67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 19, at 1616 n.3.
142. Neither Chief Justice Burger nor Justice Stevens made clear what he meant by the term
"standing." Certainly neither intended to raise the question whether Chris-Craft "alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure . . . concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). Similarly, neither
Justice raised an injury-in-fact issue. Chief Justice Burger was concerned instead with whether
the injuries admittedly suffered by Chris-Craft were suffered as a shareholder of Piper or as a
defeated tender offeror. This kind of question arguably forms the second part of Justice Douglas'
test for standing employed in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150 (1970). In Camp the Court held that sellers of the the data processing services had
standing to challenge a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency giving national banks the right
to provide similar services. The Court set forth a two-part test to determine standing. First, is
there injury in fact, economic or otherwise? Second, is the interest sought to be protected by the
complainant arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question? Id. at 152-53. Nevertheless, nowhere in the review of the
legislative history or the discussion of Chris-Craft's status does either the majority or dissent cite
any standing decisions.
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of action when it enacted § 14(e) in 1968."143 The majority opinion, however,
raises doubts about the accuracy of Justice Stevens' statement.
Although Chief Justice Burger expressly reserved ruling on the question
whether any "investor" can state a claim under section 14(e), 144 many of the
reasons he gave for not allowing Chris-Craft as a defeated tender offeror to sue
are equally applicable to target shareholders. For example, when the Court
argued that shareholders may be prejudiced because some tender offers may
never be made if massive damage claims are possible, 145 such an argument
could apply to suits brought by holders or sellers of the target's shares as well
as to those brought by shareholding defeated tender offerors. The logical conclusion of this reasoning is that no class would have an implied cause of action. The majority, therefore, arguably was disagreeing with Justice Stevens'
conclusion.
Although Justice Stevens argued that a private cause of action had been
created, the majority did not rule on that issue. Of course, the Court was not
required to make such a ruling because it decided the case on the narrower
ground of standing. Nevertheless, the majority opinion furthers confusion. By
failing to decide the case on whether a right of action existed and instead deciding that there was no standing (or, as in earlier cases, no remedy), the majority permitted speculation about whether the Court believed that a private
cause of action exists under section 14(e). For example, at times the majority
discussed the issues before it in terms of whether Chris-Craft had a "cause of
action for damages."' 146 At other times the majority discussed whether "private remedies"' 147 are available under section 14(e), and therefore raised the
question whether Chris-Craft could have obtained private injunctive relief
rather than damages. By at least raising the possibility that it could have
granted such relief, the Court permitted an inference that the Cort factors
could be used to resolve both the right of action and the remedy questions,
although it seems unlikely that the factors are either necessary or useful in
resolving the remedy question. The Court clearly has the power to award both
equitable and legal relief when an appropriate private claimant alleging violations of the Exchange Act is before it. The question really should not be
whether injunctive relief or damages are available but whether the claimant
has an implied right. Only then is the question of relief reached. Nevertheless, the Court only decided standing. Although the narrow ruling on standing
can be viewed as another way of undercutting or restricting the implication of
private causes of action, analytically Chris-Craftis not a retrenchment in that
regard because it does not purport to resolve the implication question. Moreover, this foray into the standing arena can be seen as aberrational, inasmuch
as the Court has not returned to it.148 Instead the Court next met the implica143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Chris-Craft, 430 U.S. at 55 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 42 n.28. See supra note 137.
Chris-Craft, 430 U.S. at 40.
Id. at 4, 24, 42.
Id. at 25.
The Court did discuss the standing issue in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
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tion issue head on and attempted to define it out of existence.
D. 1979: Slamming the Door?

In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington 149 Justice Rehnquist, writing an opinion from which only Justice Marshall dissented, held that customers of securities brokerage firms that were required by section 17(a) of the Exchange Act 15 °

to file certain financial reports with the SEC did not have an implied cause of
action for damages against accountants who audit such reports, based on misstatements contained in the reports. Justice Rehnquist's opinion was based on
three essential factors: (1) section 17(a), unlike other statutes from which private causes of action had been implied, did not proscribe certain conduct as
unlawful or create federal rights in favor of private parties; (2) the legislative
history of the Exchange Act is silent on the question whether a private cause of
action for damages should be available under section 17(a); and (3) the Ex-

change Act contains provisions that explicitly grant private causes of action,
including a section that creates a private cause of action against persons, such
as accountants, who "make or cause to be made" materially misleading statements in any reports or other documents filed with the SEC. 5 1 The Court
cited these three factors as indicating conclusively that Congress had not intended to create a private cause of action. Justice Rehnquist wrote that absent
such a finding there can be no implication of a private cause of action for
152
damages.
The majority made no direct attempt to apply the four-factor Cort test,
but it did not expressly disavow the test. Instead, it reinterpreted Cori. Justice
Rehnquist stated that the first three factors discussed in Cort-"the language

and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its purpose"-are ones that
Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982). In that case, however, the Court turned to the standing issue only
after it had determined that a private cause of action was available under the Commodity Exchange Act in favor of some plaintiffs. Id. at 388-90.
149. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a)(l) (1982). Section 17 of the Exchange Act was amended by the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975. Section 17(a)(l) contains essentially the same language as the first
sentence of the 1972 version of § 17(a).
151. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1982). The right of action
created by § 18(a) is limited, however, to persons who, in reliance on the statements, purchased or
sold a security whose price was affected by the statement. Since plaintiffs in the case did not allege
that the customers of the broker-dealer purchased or sold securities in reliance on § 17(a) reports,
they could not sue Touche Ross under § 18(a).
In his dissent, Justice Marshall disputes the contention espoused by the majority that § 18(a)
was intended to provide the only remedy for misstatements in reports filed with the SEC. In his
view, § 18 pertains to investors who are injured in the course of securities transactions, while § 17
is concerned exclusively with brokerage firm customers who may be injured by a broker's insolvency. Because Justice Marshall viewed § 17 as imposing duties for the benefit of private parties,
he was unwilling to assume that Congress simultaneously sought to protect a class and deprive it
of a means of protection. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 582 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
152. Justice Rehnquist stated that the issue was whether the plaintiffs "have an implied cause
of action for damages under Section 17(a) against accountants .. " Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at
562. Throughout the opinion, however, the terms "implied cause of action," "private right of
action," and "implied remedies" are used interchangeably. Compare id. at 569 ("in those cases
...
) with id. at 571 ("whether a private right of action
finding such implied private remedies.
for damages .... ").
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courts traditionally have relied on to determine legislative intent.153 He then
pointed out that Cori did not declare that each of the four factors was entitled
to equal weight.15 4 In a situation such as that in Touche Ross, in which congressional intent against implication could be discerned, Justice Rehnquist
stated that there could be no resort to the fourth factor (whether the cause of
action is one traditionally relegated to state law) or even an independent investigation of the third (whether an implied private right is necessary to effectuate
the purpose of the section).155 Justice Rehnquist in effect redefined congressional intent to encompass only whether Congress intended to create a private
right to sue and excluded whether giving the right to sue would accomplish the
congressional objectives and purposes in enacting the legislation.
In Touche Ross the Court once again distinguished, without overruling,
Borak. In response to an argument that the jurisdictional grant set forth in
section 27 of the Exchange Act required or suggested implication, the Court
made clear that the provision creates no right of action of its own force and
effect, stating that "[t]he Court in Borak found a private cause of action implicit in § 14(a)."' 1 56 Justice Rehnquist had a more difficult time dismissing
the Borak Court's recognition of and reliance on the remedial purposes underlying enactment of the Exchange Act to justify implying a private cause of
action. The opinion candidly admitted that the Court had adhered to a stricter
standard for the implication of private causes of action since Borak was decided.' 5 7 Similarly, lest there be any attempt to find an analogy between the
previously recognized private causes of action under section 10(b) and the asserted right under section 17(a), the Court stated that when it recognized a
right implicit in section 10(b), it was acquiescing to a twenty-five year history
of the lower federal courts implying such an action. There was no correspond58
ing history of implication under section 17(a).1
The majority concluded by noting that the Court "is not at liberty to legislate," and that if Congress intended brokerage firms' customers to have a
federal right of action under section 17(a), "it is well aware of how it may
effectuate that intent."' 5 9 Other than this passing reference to a separation of
powers problem, the Court did not discuss the possible constitutional
problems inherent in the implication process. Nonetheless, this was the first
securities implication case in which the Court made any allusion to constitutional difficulties in the implication area. The Court's concern was fostered
perhaps by the split decision that same term in Cannon v. University of Chicago,160 which upheld implying a private cause of action under section 901 (a)
153. Id. at 575-76.

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 575.
at 576.
at 577.
at 578.
at 577 n.19.

159. Id. at 579.
160. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). In Cannon Justice Powell strongly dissented from the majority's
holding that a private cause of action could be implied from Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982). Justice Powell stated that the four-part Cart test "is an

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.161 Unfortunately, the
Court did not respond to the argument that implication by definition is legislation. The Touche Ross Court's discussion of Borak and Banker's Life indicated, however, that a majority of the Court did not believe that implication
poses constitutional problems. If it did, the Court would not be at liberty to
acquiesce to twenty-five years of unconstitutional holdings by the lower federal courts. 162 Nor could the Court simply adopt a stricter standard for the
implication of private rights of action and let stand an unconstitutional interpretation of section 14(a).
It is clear that the Court wanted to curtail the rapid growth, and recognition by the lower courts, of implied causes of action. Since these actions were
recognized judicially there would seem to be no impediment to some judicial
retrenchment in this area. What was lacking in Touche Ross was any basis for
determining when, if ever, the Court would be receptive to implying a cause of
action from a statute not expressly providing for one. Ascertainment of congressional intent, as that term is used by Justice Rehnquist, cannot provide a
workable test, except in the unlikely event that the legislature expressly gives
the courts the discretion to recognize implied causes of action if certain conditions are present, 63 or unless somewhat precise and relatively unambiguous
standards are set forth as the means by which to determine congressional intent. The latter is what the Court seemed to be trying to do in Cart. To the
extent that Touche Ross discounted reliance on the four-factor Cort test, it
defeated this purpose.
Touche Ross was relatively uncontroversial because almost every member
of the Court believed implication from section 17(a) was inappropriate, an
undoubtedly correct result even under the older cases. 164 The Court's analysis
was, however, a change in its jurisprudence, notwithstanding Justice Brennan's assertion in his concurrence that he viewed the opinion as consistent
open invitation to federal courts to legislate causes of action not authorized by Congress. It is an

analysis not faithful to constitutional principles and should be rejected. Absent the most compelling evidenceof affirmative congressional intent, a federal court should not infer a private cause of
action." Cannon, 441 U.S. at 731 (Powell, J., dissenting).
161. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982).
162. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 577 n.19.
163. See, e.g., ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1722(a) (1980). The proposed Code would do exactly
that. Section 1722(a) provides:
IMPLIED ACTIONS. -A court, considering the nature of the defendant's conduct, the
degree of his culpability, the injury suffered by the plaintiff, and the deterrent effect of
recognizing a private action based on this Code, may recognize such an action even
though it is not expressly created by part XVII [the civil liability section of the code], but
only if (1) the action is not inconsistent with the conditions or restrictions in any of the
actions expressly created or with the scheme of this Code, (2) the provision, rule, or order
that is the basis of the action is designed for the special benefit of a class of persons to
which the plaintiff belongs against the kind of harm alleged, (3) the plaintiff satisfies the
court that under the cirumstances the type of remedy sought is not disproportionate to
the alleged violation, and (4) in cases comparable to those dealt with in section
1702(e)(2) or 1708(c)(2) or a similar provision that specifies a maximum measure of damages, a comparable maximum is imposed.
164. See Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975) discussedsupra
text accompanying notes 95-97.
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with Cort. 65 The view that the Court was using a new test in Touche Ross is
16 6
supported by the decision in TransamericaMortgageAdvisors, Inc. v. Lewis,
in which the Court reached an incorrect result that was also inconsistent with

prior case law. Unlike Touche Ross, Transamericawas not a near unanimous
decision. Four members of the Court dissented sharply.

Transamericawas brought as a derivative action on behalf of a real estate
investment trust and as a class action on behalf of the trust's shareholders,

alleging that several trustees of the trust, its investment advisors, and two corporations affiliated with the advisors, were guilty of fraud and breaches of

fiduciary duty in violation of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.167 The
complaint sought an injunction restraining further performance of an advisory
contract, rescission of the contract, restitution of fees and other consideration
paid by the trustee, an accounting of illegal profits, and damages.
Plaintiffs argued that a private cause of action should be implied from

two sections of the Investment Advisers Act: section 206,168 which prohibits
165. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 579 (Brennan, J., concurring).
166. 444 U.S. 11 (1979). Certiorari was granted in Transamerica on November 6, 1978, 47
U.S.L.W. 3317 (1978). The case was argued on March 20, 1979, id. at 3634, and restored to the
calendar for reargument on April 23, 1979, id. at 3714. Reargument was heard on October 2,
1979, id. at. 3238, and decided on November 13, 1979. Certiorari was granted in Touche Ross on
November 27, 1978, id. at 3368, argument was heard on March 26, 1979, id. at 3651, and the case
was decided on June 18, 1979.
167. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, §§ 201-21, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I to -21 (1982). The Investment Advisers Act was enacted to deal with abuses that Congress had found to exist in the
investment advisers industry. Transamerica,444 U.S. at 12-13. See 2 L. Loss, supra note 28, at
1392-94. Professor Loss states that for the first twenty years the Investment Advisers Act was little
more than a continuing census of investment advisers. In 1960, however, the statute was substantially bolstered by a series of amendments that had been sought by the SEC since 1945. The 1960
amendments affected one of the two provisions reviewed by the Court in Transamerica. The
scope of § 206, the general fraud provision, was extended to cover "all investment advisers who
use the mails or interstate facilities rather than merely those who are registered," thus making its
coverage similar to the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities and Exchange Acts, which "apply
irrespective of the availability of an exemption from registration of securities or of broker-dealers." Id. at 1414.
168. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1982). Section 206 provides
as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser by use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly-(1) to employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client; (2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client
or prospective client; (3) acting as principal for his own account, knowingly to sell any
security to or purchase any security from a client, or acting as broker for a person other
than such client, knowingly to effect any sale or purchase of any security for the account
of such client without disclosing to such client in writing before the completion of such
transaction the capacity in which he is acting and obtaining the consent of the client to
such transaction. The prohibitions of this paragraph shall not apply to any transaction
with a customer of a broker or dealer if such broker or dealer is not acting as an investment adviser in relation to such transaction; (4) to engage in any act, practice, or course
of business which is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. The Commission shall, for
the purposes of this paragraph (4) by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means
reasonably designed to prevent, such acts, practices, and courses of business as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
Section 206(4) was added to the statute in 1960. Act of Sept. 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-750, 74 Stat.
885, 887 (1960). At that time Congress also expanded the category of investment advisers subject
to the provisions of § 206.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 62

fraudulent practices by investment advisers, and section 215,169 which makes
contracts whose formation or performance would violate the Act void as to the
rights of the violator and his knowing successors in interest. Both sections
have analogies in the Exchange Act. Section 206 uses language similar to that
found in section 10(b)1 70
and rule lOb-5,17t and section 215 tracks the lan72
guage of section 29(b).1
The majority held that a limited implied cause of action existed under
section 215, but refused to recognize one implied from section 206. Characterizing the question before it as basically one of statutory construction, the Court
stated that what ultimately had to be determined was whether Congress intended to create a private remedy. t73 This necessitated beginning with the
language of the statute itself. While acknowledging that sections 215 and 206
were intended to benefit the clients of investment advisers and to establish
federal fiduciary standards to govern the advisers' conduct, the majority found
that the legislative history was completely silent about private enforcement. In
the Court's view this was not surprising because the Investment Advisers Act
does not expressly provide for any private causes of action at all. 17 4 In effect,
the majority adopted Justice Rehnquist's definition of congressional intent as
used in Touche Ross-Congress' intent to create a private right to sue-rather
than equating intent with the purposes and objectives Congress sought to accomplish by enacting the legislation.
Nevertheless, the Court found that the language of section 215 itself im17 5
plied a private cause of action for specific and limited relief in federal court.
169. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 215, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1982). Section 215 provides

in part as follows:
(b) Every contract made in violation of any provision of this subchapter and every contract heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of which involves the violation of, or
the continuance of any relationship or practice in violation of any provision of this subchapter, or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, shall be void (1) as regards to rights
of any person who, in violation of any such provision, rule, regulation, or order, shall
have made or engaged in the performance of any such contract and (2) as regards the
rights of any person who, not being a.party to such contract, shall have acquired any
right thereunder with actual knowledge of the facts by reason of which the making or
performance of such contract was in violation of any such provision.
170. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
171. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982).
172. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1982).
173. Transamerica,444 U.S. at 15-16. Again the Court uses the terms "cause of action," "right
of action," and "private remedy" interchangeably. "The question whether a statute creates a cause
of action, either expressly or by implication, is basically a matter of statutory construction." Id. at

15. "[W]hat must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create the private
remedy asserted.
... Id. at 15-16. "It is asserted that the creation of a private right of action
can fairly be inferred from the language of two sections of the Act." Id. at 16.
174. The Investment Advisers Act, unlike the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, does not
include provisions expressly providing for a private cause of action. The only provision that authorizes suits to enforce the duties or obligations set out in the Act is § 209, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9
(1982), which permits the SEC to bring suit in a federal court to enjoin violations of the provisions
of the Act or the rules and regulations promulgated under it.
175. Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 18. The Court's use of the term "federal court" can be questioned. The Investment Advisers Act, like all but one of the six original securities acts, provides
for concurrent jurisdiction in state and federal courts. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 214, 15
U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1982). A state court deciding federal law is bound to follow federal precedent.
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In construing section 215 in this manner the Court used the same analysis that

it had used in Mills when it construed section 29(b) of the Exchange Act as
providing for a private cause of action. By declaring certain contracts void the

statute necessitates that the issue of voidness be litigated somewhere, or at the
very least presumes that the issue could be raised defensively in private litiga-

tion to preclude the enforcement of an investment adviser's contract. Choosing not to limit the statute to purely defensive uses, the Court, as it did in

Mills, held that section 215 also conferred the rights to rescind the contract, to
obtain restitution of consideration paid, and to seek an injunction against con76
tinued operation of a contract.
The Court was unwilling, however, to find an implied right of action for

damages and other monetary relief under section 206. First, the Court distin-

guished the language of section 206 from that of section 215. "Section 206,"
stated the Court, "simply proscribes certain conduct, and does not in terms

create or alter any civil liabilities. If monetary liability to a private plaintiff is
to be found, it must be read into the [Investment Advisers] Act."' 177 Because

Congress expressly provided judicial and administrative means for forcing
compliance with section 206, the Court found it improbable that "Congress

absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private action."'17 The express
authorization of private suits for damages in prescribed circumstances in each
of the five federal securities acts that preceded or were enacted contemporaneously with the Investment Advisers Act strongly suggested to the Court that

Congress did not intend to impose monetary liability on violators of Investment Advisers Act provisions because "when Congress wished to provide a
'
private damages remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly. 179

As support for the preceeding conclusions, the Court cited section 214 of
the Investment Advisers Act,18 0 which provides the federal courts with juris-

diction over suits in equity to enjoin violations of the Act and the rules, regulations, and orders promulgated pursuant thereto. It contrasted this grant of

jurisdiction in section 214 with the broader jurisdictional provisions of the SeSee Hazen, Allocation of Jurisdiction between the State and Federal CourtsforPrivate Remedies
Underthe FederalSecuritiesLaws, 60 N.C.L. REv. 710 (1982). The Court's use of the term federal
court could be read as limiting its holding to federal courts and thereby creating an inference that
state courts could give broader effect to the same statutory language.
176. Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 19. The Court footnotes its holding with the following: "One
possibility, of course, is that Congress intended that claims under § 215 would be raised only in
state court. But we decline to adopt such an anomalous construction without some indication that
Congress in fact wished to remit the litigation of a federal right to the state courts." Id. at 19 n.8.
The intent of this note is ambiguous at best. The Court does not give any reasons why a state
court might be able to construe a federal statute more broadly than a federal court.
177. Id. at 19.
178. Id. at 20 (citing Justice Powell's dissent in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677
(1979)). Section 17 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-17 (1982), makes
willful violations of the Act criminal offenses. Section 9, id. § 80b-9, authorizes the SEC to bring
civil actions in federal courts to enjoin compliance with the Act, and § 3, id. § 80b-3, authorizes
the SEC to impose administrative sanctions on persons who violate the Act.
179. Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 21 (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 572
(1979)).
180. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1982).
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curities Act,181 Exchange Act,' 8 2 Public Utility Holding Company Act,' 8 3
Trust Indenture Act,' 8 4 and Investment Company Act, 185 all of which provide
for jurisdiction of actions at law as well as suits in equity. While the majority
did not base its decision against implication of an action for damages on the
jurisdictional section, it nevertheless cited the failure to include jurisdiction
1
over actions at law in section 214 as additional support for its conclusion. 86
Finally, the majority rejected the contention that all four of the Cort factors must be considered, citing its disposition of the same argument inTouche
Ross without distinguishing the two cases. In Touche Ross, the first two Cori
factors, the legislative history and the language and focus of the statute, were
not found to support implication. The Touche Ross Court also held that the
first three factors were simply the traditional means used to determine legislative intent. Therefore, there was no need to examine all of the factors, or to
give them equal weight, once a conclusion regarding intent was formed. In
Transamerica,however, the Court determined that the first Cort factor could
support implication because the Investment Advisers Act was designed to protect adviser's clients. Going to the second Cort factor, the Court was persuaded by a silent legislative history and a reading of the Act in its entirety
that Congress did not intend to create a private cause of action. It did not then
examine the third and fourth Corl factors. The Court, therefore, seemed to
indicate that the absence of any discussion in the legislative history of an intent to provide a private damage remedy makes unnecessary further investigation of congressional intent. The Court also used the expressio unius est
87
exclusio aiterius principle of statutory construction to bolster its conclusion.1
In other words, the failure to find an express intent to provide a private cause
of action is sufficient to preclude implication. In all but name, Cort was overruled. Furthermore, the result reached by the majority regarding section 206
was inconsistent with the Court's prior implication decisions. In Borak and
Banker's Life, statutes almost identical to section 206 were found to support
implication.
181. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982).
182. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982).
183. 15 U.S.C. § 79y (1982).
184. 15 U.S.C. § 77vvv (1982).
185. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1982).
186. Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 21-22. The majority does this even though in Touche Ross
(decided the previous term) the Court had held that a jurisdictional grant can create no right of
action of its own force and effect. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 577.
187. "[T]he expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
521 (5th ed. 1979). This maxim of statutory construction had also been used by the Court in
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) and
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 419 (1975), to support decisions not

to imply causes of action from statutes that contained express means of enforcement. While the
Court was always careful to note that even the most basic general principles of statutory construction must yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative intent, there are at least two ways of
interpreting what was meant by "contrary evidence of legislative intent." The plaintiff might be
required to prove that Congress intended to create a private cause of action in his favor. It is also
possible that the requisite contrary intent could be shown by proving that Congress did not intend
that the remedies provided in a statute should be exclusive. See Comment, supra note 3, at 63.
The Court in Transamerica seems to have adopted the former meaning.
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Justice White wrote a strong dissent in which Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Stevens joined. The dissenters argued forcefully that the Cort analysis
should have been followed because, if it had been used, the Court would have
recognized implication of a private cause of action from section 206.188 Acknowledging that decisions after Cori indicated that implication questions
should be resolved primarily by determining whether Congress intended to
create a private cause of action, Justice White nevertheless argued that the
four Cort factors were the criteria by which such intention could be discerned.
Justice White indicated that the third and fourth factors should not have been
discarded because they allow for growth and change in the law and embody a
recognition that statutory interpretation involves more than discerning what
Congress may have intended when it debated and enacted the legislation.
These factors give the Court room to discern what Congress would intend
now.

In the Transamerica dissent, there appeared for the first time in a statutory implication case a more candid discussion of the differences between the
questions whether an implied right of action exists and whether a particular
remedy ought to be implied. 189 The dissenters were in favor not only of implying a right of action from section 206 but also of implying a damage remedy. Justice White therefore argued that once an implied right of action was
recognized, 190 the Court was not constrained in determining what type of relief to make available, because "in the absence of any contrary indication by
Congress, courts may provide private litigants exercising implied rights of action whatever relief is consistent with the congressional purpose."' 19 1 This argument was not new of course, having been set out in Borak. And the
majority opinion is rightly criticized for using arguments against implying a
damage remedy to justify a refusal to imply a right of action.
Unfortunately, Justice White did not carry the discussion far enough. He
failed, for example, to deal with the fact that recognizing an implied right of
action does not necessarily prohibit recognizing that Congress did not intend
all remedies to be available to redress a particular violation. Congressional
intent, therefore, could have a role to play, albeit a negative role, when courts
imply remedies. An affirmative indication of congressional intent derived
from substantive provisions is necessary to imply a right of action. Jn the absence of such provisions, implication should not be undertaken. Any form of
188. Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 27 (White, J., dissenting).
189. Justice Brennan explored the issue in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), in the context of implying a private cause of action from a provision of the Constitution. See supra note 19.
190. Justice White found substantive support for implication of a private cause of action from
the language of § 206, as well as from the relationship between that section and other substantive
provisions of the Investment Adviser's Act, including § 215, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1982). Since
§ 215 creates no right of action of its own force and effect and imposes no liabilities, in Justice
White's view that section merely specifies one consequence of a violation of the substantive provisions of § 206. The need for a private action to enforce § 215, which itself is violated because of
the violation of § 206, supported the view that Congress contemplated the use of private actions to
redress violations of § 206. This analysis was conducted under the framework set forth in Cori.
Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 28-30 (White, J., dissenting).
191. Transamerica,444 U.S. at 30 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Borak, Barbour, andRigsby).
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relief can be made available, however, when express or implied actions are

recognized, as long as there is no indication of congressional intent to prohibit
use of the particular remedy. t 92

Transamerica was an analytical retrenchment with respect to implying
causes of action. It was generally assumed after Transamericaand a number
of other implication cases, which were decided in the 1980-81 Term, 193 that no

new causes of action would be implied; nevertheless, the Supreme Court in its
1982 opinion in MerrillLynch, Pierce,Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran1 94 held

that an implied cause of action existed under the Commodity Exchange Act
(CEA). 19 5 In doing so, a majority of the Court at least inferentially concluded
that judicial recognition of an implied private cause of action does not violate
the separation of powers doctrine.' 96 The opinion also provided a new test, or
superimposed an additional test, for implying a private cause of action.
The CEA governs the trading of commodity futures. A much amended

statute, the forebearer of the CEA was enacted in 1921. Amendments were
enacted in 1936, 1968, 1974, and 1978. Although the 1974 legislation added

provisions requiring arbitration procedures for the settlement of certain
claims 197 and creating reparations procedures for persons damaged as a result
of violations of the CEA or its implementing regulation,198 the CEA does not
expressly provide for private causes of action.
Two decisions were before the Court for review. The Court of Appeals
192. See supra notes 10 & 27 and accompanying text.
193. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981) (two Justices concurred in part and dissented in part) (Federal Water Pollution Control Act
and Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 do not provide any implied causes
of action); Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981) (unanimous) (implied
cause of action for contribution not available to defendant in federal antitrust case); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (6-3 decision) (Federal Water Pollution Act Amendments
of 1972 displaced federal common law, at least with respect to the claims brought by the state, and
federal common law could not be used to impose more stringent effluent standards than those set
forth under the Act and the attendant regulation); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981)
(four justices concurring) (Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act does not provide an implied
right of action); Northwest Airlines v. Transportation Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981) (unanimous; Blackmun, J., not participating) (no implied right of action under Equal Pay Act and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for contribution); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450
U.S. 754 (1981) (unanimous) (Davis-Bacon Act does not provide employees with a private cause
of acti6n forback wages under a contract that has been administratively determined not to call for
Davis-Bacon work and which thus does not contain a prevailing wage stipulation).
194. 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
195. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982).
196. See Curran,456 U.S. at 376. Justice Stevens described the issue not in terms ofwhether a
cause of action can be implied but rather as whether "an implied private remedy violates the
separation-of-powers doctrine." Id. (emphasis added). In his dissent, Justice Powell discussed the
issue in terms of whether "federal courts are free to hold, as a general rule of statutory interpretation, that private rights of action are to be implied unless Congress 'evidences a contrary intention.'" Id. at 402 (Powell, J., dissenting).
197. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 209, 88 Stat.
1401 (adding § 5a(l 1) of the CEA, codified as amended at 7 U.S.C § 7a(l 1) (1982)).
198. Commodity Futures Exchange Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 106, 88 Stat. 1393-95
(adding § 14 of the CEA, codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 18 (1982)). This section authorized
the Commission to investigate complaints and, "if in its opinion the facts warrant such action," to
afford a hearing before an administrative law judge. Reparations orders entered by the Commission are subject to judicial review.
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for the Sixth Circuit had held that an implied cause of action existed in favor
of a customer against a registered commodity futures merchant. 19 9 The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit had held that speculators (customers) who
invested in futures contracts had causes of action implied from the CEA
against a commodities exhange, its officials, and several firms of futures commission merchants. 2° ° In both of the cases a majority of the respective appeals
courts noted that an implied cause of action was generally thought to exist
prior to the 1974 amendments to the CEA, and inferred from this that the 1974
Congress was aware of and desired to preserve such action when it enacted the
amending legislation. 20 1 Judge Friendly, writing the Second Circuit opinion,
also commented upon the similarity between implying private remedies under
the CEA and implying remedies under other federal statutes, particularly
20 2
those regulating trading in securities.
Justice Stevens, writing for a 5-4 majority, began by recognizing that in
certain limited circumstances it is appropriate to recognize a private cause of
action even when Congress has not expressly provided such an action, if doing
so would be consistent with an intent on Congress' part to make such an action
available to the persons benefited by the legislation. Initially, "[w]hen federal
statutes were less comprehensive," stated the Court, it "applied a relatively
simple test to determine the availability of an implied private remedy. If a
statute was enacted for the benefit of a special class, the judiciary normally
recognized a remedy for members of that class." 20 3 Justice Stevens viewed
Cort, however, as changing the manner in which the Court went about the
task of implying private causes of action. He characterized the change as requiring a more careful scrutiny of legislative intent than the 1916 Rigsby case
and the cases following it had required. The change in emphasis was necessitated by the increased volume and complexity of federal legislation.
The majority did not deal with the question of congressional intent in a
straightforward manner. It did not discuss and investigate Congress' intent
when it enacted the substantive provisions of the CEA that were alleged to be
the basis for implied actions-in other words, the majority did not use the
Cort test to determine whether such provisions could be the basis for implied
causes of action.2° 4 Instead, the majority discussed whether Congress intended to prohibit continued judicial recognition of implied causes of action
under the CEA when it amended the statute in 1974. The 1974 amendments
199. Curran
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980), at'd,
(1982).
456 U.S. 353
200. Leist v. Simploy, 638 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1980), aj'd, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
201. The dissenting judges (Judge Mansfield in the Second Circuit and Judge Phillips in the
Sixth Circuit) reasoned that the pre-1974 cases recognizing a private cause of action under the
CEA were decided incorrectly and that a fair application of the criteria identified in Cort required
that plaintiffs' damages claims be rejected. Id. at 323-56 (Mansfield, J., dissenting); Curran, 622
F.2d at 237 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
202. Curran, 638 F.2d at 299. Judge Friendly used the term "implied remedies" to mean implied causes of action.
203. Curran, 456 U.S. at 374 (citing Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916)).
204. Justice Stevens indicated, however, that if the Cart test were applied to the substantive
provisions at issue in the case, some would and others would not support implication. Id. at 391.
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were deemed the crucial ones because the Cort decision in 1975 presumably
put Congress on notice that the Supreme Court would thereafter be applying a
different test to determine whether a statute created a private cause of action. 20 5 Thus, one of the major issues dividing the majority from the dissent
was which Congress' intent needed to be discerned.
The majority's focus on this aspect of intent, however, arguably reaffirms
or is consistent with the meaning given by Justice Rehnquist in Touche Ross to
the term "congressional intent"-that is, did Congress intend to give private
parties the right to sue. This definition, which was adopted by the majority in
Transamerica, sharply conflicts with the meaning of the term "congressional
intent" as set out in Corr. The Cort four-factor test clearly used the term to
encompass an investigation of what Congress intended to accomplish by enacting the particular statutory provision being construed. While the Con test
was not insensitive to, nor did it preclude, an examination of whether the legislative history gave any express or implied indicia of an intent to allow private
suits, it also required the Court to determine whether the substantive goals of
the legislation could be accomplished absent private civil litigation.
Disturbing is the apparent assumption of both the majority and minority
in Curran that the Court can, in effect, order Congress to include language in
statutes expressly acknowledging the right of a private party to sue by refusing
to recognize such a right absent express congressional acknowledgement, even
if the Court is able to discern that Congress' objectives could only be effected
if private suits were allowed and even if the statutory language or the legislative history does not indicate any intent on the part of Congress to deny or
prohibit such a right. Curran in effect holds that legislation enacted after publication of the Con opinion in 1975 will be construed in denigration of a discerable intent of Congress. While such a result would be necessary if the
Court were willing to hold that judicial imlication of a cause of action was an
unconstitutional exercise of power by the federal courts, neither the majority
nor the dissenters seem prepared to so rule.
Perhaps the more important issue in Curran was the veiled debate between Justices Stevens and Powell over the constitutionality of implication.
Justice Stevens noted that because the Rigsby approach prevailed throughout
most of the Court's history there was no merit to the argument that the judicial
recognition of an implied remedy violates the separation of powers doctrine.2°6 The dissent did not directly confront the issue. For example, Justice
Powell wrote, "As the court's citation of the Restatement of Torts made apparent, [inquiring whether Congress had created a regulatory system for the benefit of the plaintiffs' class] has been thought appropriate for common-law courts
of general jurisdiction. But our cases establish that it is not appropriate for
205. Id. at 378-82.
206. Id. at 378. Justice Stevens directed his refutation of the argument that implication violates the separation of powers doctrine at the petitioners, rather than at Justice Powell's exposition
of the same idea in his dissent to Curran. Perhaps this is because Justice Powell did not base his
dissent expressly on the argument.
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federal courts possessed only of limited jurisdiction. 2 0° 7 Later he noted that
the pre-1974 lower court cases that had held that private causes of action could
be implied from the CEA were fundamentally erroneous, having implied a
cause of action under a federal statute on common-law principles. Because
the majority opinion presumed congressional knowledge of these cases in 1974
and 1978, when the CEA was amended, and from this knowledge inferred
congressional intent to continue or preserve the implied cause of action, Justice Powell felt compelled to call this line of reasoning "inconsistent with fundamental premises of our structure of government. '208 Justice Powell
concluded his dissent by once again alluding to the separation of powers concept when he called the majority opinion "disquieting because of its implicit
view of the judicial role in the creation of federal law" 20 9 and described the
majority's concept of the lawmaking powers of courts at common law as being
"inconsistent with the theory and structure of our constitutional
'2 10
government.
In his discussion, Justice Powell seemed to ignore that the Court had
changed direction, a proposition candidly admitted by Justice Stevens, 21 1 and
that the Court changed direction for policy reasons, not because of constitutional principles or pursuant to congressional directive. 2 12 Justice Powell later
explained some of these policy considerations when he stated that modern federal regulatory statutes tend to be exceedingly complex, and that in this context, courts should recognize that intricate policy calculations are necessary to
decide when new enforcement measures are desirable additions to a particular
regulatory structure. 21 3 What is missing from Justice Powell's discussion of
policy, however, is recognition that if creating causes of action, as opposed to
devising remedies, is constitutionally mandated to be a legislative function, the
Court is not free to recognize such actions based on its own view of whether
doing so is advisable for governmental policy reasons.
Curran cannot be viewed as relaxing the restrictive, and arguably incorrect, analysis used in Transamerica. A majority of the Court still apparently
found no constitutional prohibition to implying private causes of action, while
at the same time effectively refused to imply such actions unless it could determine that Congress in effect forgot to include express authorization in the statute as enacted. The further device of construing differently statutes enacted
before or after Cort is analytically unsound. The distinction does not even
promote predictability because the statute construed in Transamerica was a
pre-Cort statute. Furthermore, both the majority and dissent in Transamerica
207. Id. at 399 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
208. Id. at 402 (Powell, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 408 (Powell, J., dissenting).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Justice Stevens wrote, "The increased complexity of federal legislation and the increased
volume of federal litigation strongly supported the desirability of a more careful scrutiny of legislative intent than Rigsby had required." Id. at 377 (footnote omitted).
213. Id. at 408 (Powell, J.,dissenting).
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agreed that section 209 of the Investment Advisers Act was at least intended to
create rights and duties for the benefit of the party seeking to assert the private
cause of action. The majority in Curran admitted that all but one of the CEA
provisions which the Court held in that case to give rise to a private cause of
action would not even meet the original, unreformed Cori test, because they
were framed in general terms not purporting to confer special rights on any
identifiable class of persons.214 The Court reached this result even though it
had refused to imply causes of action from similar statutes in Barbour and
Touche Ross. Perhaps the best thing that can be said for the Curran decision
is that a majority of the Court was unwilling to renounce judicial implication
of private causes of action.
III.

ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court's continued willingness to recognize the propriety of
judicially implying causes of action, at least in certain limited situations, necessarily means that the lower federal courts should continue to imply such
actions in appropriate circumstances. Unfortunately, the Court has not yet
developed an analytical framework that lower federal courts and litigants can
use to identify such appropriate circumstances with any degree of predictability. Absent such a formulation, the Court hinders one of the more important
functions that a highest appellate court can perform: supplying, to the extent
possible, certainty and finality, thereby reducing the need for litigation or at
least curtailing its length and expense.
In large part the Supreme Court's failure reflects its inability to reach a
consensus regarding the sources, or absence thereof, of the federal judiciary's
power to imply causes of action. Unwilling to hold that the courts lack the
constitutional power to imply causes of action, but at the same time cognizant
of and sensitive to our governmental system of separate and limited powers,
the Court has ruled that causes of action may only be implied when consistent
with a discernable congressional intent to authorize such actions. Regrettably,
the Court has not yet articulated what suffices to show, or is encompassed
within, congressional intent.
The Court has made clear in cases such as Barbour, Cori, and Touche
Ross that a cause of action will not be implied when the plaintiff can support
implication only with the enactment of a statute, framed in general terms, that
does not purport to confer special rights on any identifiable class of persons.
The Court has not succeeded in uniformly defining additional limits, however.
At its most restrictive extreme, the Court in Touche Ross and Transamerica
seems to have equated the congressional intent necessary to supply the requisite power to imply a cause of action with an affirmative showing in the record
that Congress forgot, overlooked, or otherwise neglected to include words in
the statute that expressly give a person the right to sue. Transamerica'salternative method of showing congressional intent to permit implication is almost as
214. Id. at 390-9 1.
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restrictive as the above "forgot equals intent" rule-the statute in question
must be one in which the failure to imply a cause of action would preclude
enforcement of rights specifically created by the statute.2 15 The voidability
are included in several of the securities acts are examples of
provisions that
216
such statutes.
Arguably, the Court has found a middle ground in its most recent implication case. In Curran the Court did not renounce or abandon the "forgot
equals intent" formulation. Instead it superimposed additional tests upon, or
created exceptions to, that rule. Pointing to the Court's admitted change in
approach articulated in Cort, Curran held that a different, less restrictive test
would be used when implying causes of action from statutes enacted prior to
1975. In such cases the requisite congressional intent could be shown by discerning that Congress was aware at the time it enacted or amended the statute
in question that the lower federal courts had either already or were likely to
imply causes of action.
At the other end of the spectrum, the Court in Borak and Banker's Life,
cases that have not been overruled or even in some instances distinguished,
held that the requisite intent can be shown by identifying the purposes Congress sought to accomplish in enacting a statute and then asking whether such
purposes would be enhanced or furthered by allowing a private right to sue,
even if the statute expressly includes alternative methods of enforcement.
Statutes such as sections 10(b) and 14(a) of the Exchange Act, which declare
certain conduct unlawful and were enacted for the benefit of an identifiable
group, are examples of statutes from which the Court has implied causes of
action. This approach arguably has also been used in cases that post-date
Cort, such as Cannon217 and Curran,2 18 showing that the Court has not abandoned this more liberal strand of the implication of rights doctrine.
The lack of a coherent doctrinal approach to determining congressional
intent to permit implication of a cause of action has undoubtedly led the
Supreme Court to attempt to avoid the analytical difficulties by deciding cases
on alternative grounds such as standing or the lack of remedy. In these cases,
such as Chris-Craft and Rondeau, the Court invariably ruled negatively,
thereby making it unnecessary to deal with the harder question of congres215. See supra text accompanying notes 175-76.
216. See supra note 35.
217. In Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, the Court held that § 901(a) of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982), explicitly confers a benefit on persons discriminated against on the basis of sex. The Court, applying the Cori factors, recognized an implied
cause of action even though § 902 of Title IX, id. § 1682, established a procedure for the termination of federal financial support for institutions violating § 901. Section 901 provides, in part, that
"[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance."
218. In Curran the Court found § 4b of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1982),
to support an implied cause of action, due to its similarity to the language of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act. The Court also held in Curran that implied causes of action could be based on other
provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act that "are framed in general terms and do not purport
to confer special rights on any identifiable class of persons." Curran, 456 U.S. at 391.
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sional intent to allow judicial implication of a private cause of action. Of
course, standing and remedy can be viewed as the narrower bases for decision,
particularly in view of the possible underlying difficulties in implication cases.
In addition, however, the Court may prefer to use the lack of standing or remedy as a basis for decision, because they are areas in which the Court has
traditionally been thought to possess greater discretion and authority.
Compounding the confusion, underlying concern about the Court's power
to imply causes of action has been reflected in yet another way. Although the
Court apparently is sensitive to the differences between implying a right of
action and implying a remedy or resolving jurisdictional issues, it has in many
of its implied cause of action cases neglected to make clear which question it
was answering. As a result, the Court arguably has both restricted its ability to
devise remedies and has in some cases assumed that it has greater power or
flexibility to imply rights of action that it actually may have.
The underlying legal premise of the "forgot equals intent" rule, as articulated in Transamerica, must reflect a belief that absent express or quasi-express congressional authorization, the Court has no power to recognize
implied causes of action. A majority of the Court has not, however, held that
the federal judiciary lacks such constitutional power. Indeed, Justice Stevens
in his majority opinion in Curran indicated that the Court actually possessed
this authority. The Court, then, is operating under what may be a false and
unduly restrictive premise. Unless the Court confronts the underlying constitutional issue directly, it will continue to decide implication cases more narrowly than necessary because of its unresolved doubts. The extremely
restrictive position adopted in Transamericashould only be used if a majority
of the Court determines that judicial power to imply causes of action does not
exist. Failing to make such a ruling, the Court must at least either develop a
new rationale or reaffirm its previous holdings that upheld implication.2 1 9
Because a majority of the Court has thus far not overruled any of its old
implication cases, such as Borak and Banker's Life, the new rationale, if any,
should to the extent possible reconcile the Court's prior implication decisions.
At the same time, any new formulation should not restrict unnecessarily the
federal courts' freedom to perform functions that they not only have the power
to perform but the duty to perform as part of the judicial function. A review
of the Court's decisions reveals that such an analytical framework already
exists.
The four-prong test of Cort supplies the basic structure for such a rationale. For this test to be applied appropriately, however, its use must be limited
219. In Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983), a case concerned with the
overlap between the express cause of action created in § 11 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k
(1982), and the implied cause of action based on § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, the Court stated:
"Most significantly for present purposes, a private right of action under Section 10(b) of the 1934
Act and Rule lOb-5 has been consistently recognized for more than 35 years. The existence of this
implied remedy is simply beyond peradventure." 103 U.S. at 686-87 (footnote omitted). The
Court offered no explanation or analysis, other than calling attention to the judicial precedent of
recognition, for its reaffirmation of the implied cause of action.
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to determining whether a right of action can be implied and must not be used
to answer questions regarding availability of remedies, standing, or subject
matter jurisdiction. In addition, the Cort Court's use of congressional intent as
the second part of the test must be defined more broadly than the Court has
construed it in its more recent cases, such as Touche Ross and Transamerica.
Rather than "forgot equals intent," intent must be defined or equated with
congressional purpose; congressional purpose in turn must be defined as what
substantive goals Congress sought to accomplish, rather than whether Congress meant to make available the procedural device of filing suit.
It is necessary, however, to analyze why the issues of jurisdiction, right of
action, relief, and standing are analytically severable. Judicial implication or
recognition of a cause of action means that a person will be allowed to pursue
relief in federal court from injuries caused by another's violation of a statute.
To imply a cause of action, therefore, a federal court must have subject matter
jurisdiction, must be able to identify statutorily created rights and duties giving rise to a right to sue, must determine that it can grant the relief sought, and
must determine that the plaintiff is the appropriate party to assert the claim.
Generally a federal court cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction unless Congress has provided it. A statute conferring jurisdiction is therefore a
prerequisite to implication. 220 The existence of a jurisdiction granting statute
does not, however, authorize the federal courts to legislate. Therefore, before
a federal court can imply a cause of action, Congress must have enacted a
statute conferring rights on the plaintiff and concurrently imposing duties on
the defendant. 22 ' When such rights-creating statutes also expressly authorize
private civil suits no implication problem exists.222 It is only when the statute
does not expressly authorize private lawsuits that the courts will need to imply
private causes of action.
Two types of substantive, or rights- and duties-creating, statutes have
been found by the Supreme Court to support implication. Statutes that purport to affect the legal relationships between private parties but which do not
expressly authorize resort to the courts to vindicate or enforce compliance are
one group. Section 29(b) of the Exchange Act as construed in Mills, and section 209 of the Investment Advisers Act as construed in Transamerica, are
examples of such statutes. This type of statute has not given the Court serious
difficulty because without implication the statute cannot be enforced. The
other type consists of statutes that prohibit certain conduct or declare acts to
be unlawful. Sections 10(b) and 14(a) of the Exchange Act and section 206 of
the Investment Advisors Act are examples of this type. In all cases but Transamerica, in which the Court declined to imply a right of action from section
206, the Court has upheld implication when it has been able to determine that
such a statute was intended to benefit an identifiable group and that private
220. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 14, §§ 3-31, at 115-16. See also sypra notes 13-17 and

accompanying text.
221. See supra note 18.
222. See statutes cited supra note 34.
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suits are necessary to fully effectuate the congressional purposes that led to the
enactment of the statute.
Admittedly, this determination of statutory intent is the hardest part of
the process and an area in which the Court might be tempted to supply its own
judgment for that of Congress. Nevertheless, unless and until the Court determines that discerning congressional intent is tantamount to legislating and
therefore unconstitutional, it has the duty to undertake the task. Equating intent with forgot, however, has the practical effect of relieving the Court of this
responsibility. The four-factor Cart test appears to be a workable, and perhaps the best, means of discerning congressional intent, at least when intent is
defined more broadly than the "forgot equals intent" test of Transamerica.
Apparently, at least a majority of the Court agrees, because Cori has not been
overruled.
The Cart test should not, however, be used to resolve the relief and standing questions. The Rondeau and Chris-Craft decisions are examples of attempts by the Court to use the test this way. Whether the Cart Court itself
viewed the four-factor test as limited to answering only the right of action
question is debatable. The test should, however, be so limited, because its
application in other contexts unjustifiably invades or restricts the Court's powers to decide questions involving relief and standing and, in addition, fosters
confusion concerning the differences between jurisdiction, implying rights of
action and remedies, and recognizing standing.
Courts, including federal courts, traditionally have exercised a great deal
of flexibility and discretion when fashioning remedies to vindicate rights created by Congress. 223 Even when Congress has created a right, expressly authorized private suit, and set out particular forms of relief that can be granted,
the Supreme Court has not felt constrained to deny other types of relief, unless, of course, Congress has expressly prohibited such relief.224 There should
be no reason for the federal courts to limit their ability to provide relief simply
because the right to sue is implied instead of expressly created. Applying the
four-factor Cart test to resolve the remedy question could have this constricting effect. Because the Court does not always make clear which question it
thinks it is resolving when it uses the Cart test, the different effect that legislative intent has on implying remedies may be thought applicable when attempting to answer the more difficult right of action question.
Similarly, the courts have long thought themselves competent and arguably freer to resolve standing questions, 225 engaging in a more traditional kind
of statutory interpretation to do so. Attempting to resolve standing questions
by resort to the Cart test, as was done in part in Chris-Craft, and to a lesser
223. See supra notes 10 & 27.
224. See cases cited supra note 27.
225. While the federal courts are not completely free to determine standing, the Supreme
Court has nevertheless exercised a great deal of discretionary judgment in the area. In 1980 Professor Gunther noted that while the Warren Court was quite lenient in recognizing standing, the
Burger Court has signified that it is unwilling to abandon standing barriers entirely. G. GtNTHER, supra note 19, at 1617.
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extent in Curran, is not only unnecessary but also leads to confusion regarding
the federal courts' power to imply causes of action and could, given the stricter
limitations on the courts' power in the implication area, unduly restrict the
ability of the courts to resolve standing questions.
The attempt in Curran to grandfather in causes of action either recognized by the lower courts prior to 1975 or recognized by the courts after 1975
but implied from statutes enacted prior to that date is simply not defensible.
In Curran the Court held that even though the Court today, using the "forgot
equals intent" test, might not imply a cause of action from a particular statute,
it would do so if the statute were enacted prior to 1975 because Congress had
not been put on notice that the Court was adopting a new test for implication.
The Court held that even if a statute would never have supported implication
under any test used by the Court, including that used in Borak, if the lower
federal courts nevertheless had erroneously implied a cause of action from
such a statute, and if the Court could discern that Congress was aware that
such actions had been implied, then the Court today would uphold
implication.
From one perspective Curran can be viewed as more liberal than the decisions immediately preceding it because it permits implication even though the
"forgot equals intent" test has not been met. On the other hand, Curran can
be viewed as having only created an exception to the strict "forgot equals intent" test, rather than as having adopted a less restrictive test. It is clear, however, that the Court is not abandoning "forgot equals intent" on a broad basis.
Although Justice Stevens claims that there are no constitutional bars to judicial implication, the retention of the "forgot equals intent" test belies that
assertion.
If the federal courts have the power to imply causes of action, they must
do so when they discern that Congress intended (in the Cort sense) such a
result, regardless of whether the statute under review was enacted prior to the
time that the Court changed its direction. If the federal courts have no such
power, the Supreme Court cannot continue to allow previously recognized, but
unconstitutional causes of action to be litigated and new unconstitutional
causes of action to be recognized by the lower federal courts.
Last, the inability of the current Court to agree on the implication issue
will increase the volume of litigation in the area, a result the Court expressly
sought to preclude.2 26 This is so because the Supreme Court, while not flatly
prohibiting the lower courts from recognizing new implied causes of action,
has not given the lower courts a reliable and consistent test for identifying
when such causes of action are to be implied. Thus, defendants will undoubtedly continue to challenge the propriety of any implied causes of action not yet
approved by the Supreme Court. The problem is further exacerbated by the
Court's failure to separate clearly its serious concerns regarding the need for
226. See, e.g., Justice Stevens' comment in Curran that the increased volume of federal litigation strongly supported the desirability of a more careful scrutiny of legislative intent than Rigsby
had required. Curran, 456 U.S. at 377.
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congressionally supplied power in the right of action arena from the different
needs in the remedies and standing areas. Confusion about which test applies
will lead to unnecessary litigation over the courts' powers to proceed in these
other areas. Therefore, to the extent that the Court adopted the strict "forgot
equals intent" test to contain litigation, its purpose has been defeated.
The Cort test, subject to limitations, is workable because it is possible to
reconcile most of the previous decisions without overruling any of them except
Transamerica. It provides an appropriate balance between congressional and
judicial powers, because it takes into account the necessity of having Congress
supply the substantive rights and duties sought to be enforced while at the
same time permitting the courts to exercise some flexibility in determining
whether to allow a private lawsuit to obtain vindication of the congressionally
created rights. The use of the Cort test will thus reconcile the cases, ensure
adherence to precedent, and keep judicial and legislative powers in balance.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The eleven year period between Borak and Cort has been referred to as
the "expansion era" 22 7 or the "ebullient stage"2 28 in the history of the
Supreme Court's implication of causes of action from federal securities law
statutes. The subsequent decisions have been viewed and described as restric'229
tive and the period post-dating Cort has been labeled the "contraction era."
In hindsight, this shift in the tenor of the Court's decisions, if not inevitable,
was predictable. Whether a cause of action is created expressly by Congress or
recognized by the courts for the first time, the scope or content of the action
must be delimited. In numerous decisions both pre- and post-dating Cort, the
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have done so. The courts also
must decide which statutes will support implied causes of action and develop a
rationale for so deciding.
Touche Ross, Transamerica, and Curran are more than limit-setting decisions, however. The Court arguably has tried to renounce its prior practice of
recognizing implied causes of action without, however, overruling its prior affirmative decisions or articulating a consistent constitutionally or policy based
rationale for doing so. In the process it has rendered decisions that add to the
confusion regarding what it is that a federal court does when it implies causes
of action and the sources of the courts' power to do so.
Cort was an attempt to set forth a rationale or test that could be used for
determining when causes of action would be implied. The test, or a modified
version of it, is still workable. What Cori did not do, and what has yet to be
227. 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 81, § 2.2, at 461. ("Like most histories, this
one has some conspicuous major movements. The clearest is the birth and expansion of implied
private rights of action until the mid 1970s, and their contraction since then, primarily in the

Supreme Court's retrenchment cases.")
228. L. Loss, supra note 10, at 1058. ("The Supreme Court's decisions in the past twenty years
have gone through several stages, not marked by clear boundaries. The first. . . might be called
the 'ebullient stage'....").
229. 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 81, § 2.2, at 461.
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done, is to set forth or explain the sources or limits of the federal courts' power
to imply causes of action under any circumstances. It is apparent that not all
members of the existing Court agree that such a power exists. Unless and until
the Court deals directly with this question confusion in the area will continue.
The Supreme Court's emphasis in its more recent implication decisions
on the intent aspect of the Cort test is undoubtedly an expression of its view
that Congress must ultimately be the source of that power. What remains is to
define what is meant by the term "congressional intent." If intent is defined in
too limited a manner, the Court runs the risk of unnecessarily limiting powers
that it has traditionally exercised in the remedies and standing areas and that
arguably are necessary if our federal judicial system is to continue to operate
efficiently and flexibly. If the Court separately addresses the several questions
that must be answered to determine whether a cause of action should be implied, with particular emphasis on the role that determining congressional intent should play, a reasonable but not unnecessarily restrictive approach will
result.

